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I. INTRODUCTION
The nation awoke on December 16, 2005, to an article published in
The New York Times which reported that, in 2002, President George W.
Bush secretly authorized the National Security Agency ("NSA") to con-
duct warrantless electronic surveillance of international communications
involving those with links to al-Qaeda.I The NSA program sparked a
number of notable events in 2006,2 yet at the time of this writing more
* J.D. Candidate, University of Miami School of Law, 2007; B.A., Emory University, 2004.
Many thanks are due to Professor Stephen Vladeck for helping me develop the topic of this Note
and for guiding me through the writing process.
1. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at Al.
2. The most significant development of 2006 was the ruling of a federal district court
declaring the NSA program unconstitutional. See ACLU v. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D.
Mich. 2006). In the preceding months, the Senate Judiciary Committee held numerous hearings
on the legal issues surrounding the NSA program. See, e.g., An Examination of the Call to
Censure the President Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006); NSA III: War
Time Executive Power and the FISA Court Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong.
(2006); Wartime Executive Power and the National Security Agency's Surveillance Authority
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006), available at http://
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than one year later, the law remains fundamentally unchanged.3
The principal law implicated by the revelation of the NSA program,
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), is the "exclusive
means" by which the executive branch may lawfully conduct foreign
intelligence surveillance in this country.4 The future of this statutory
warrant procedure, enacted nearly thirty years ago 5 in response to the
history of abuse committed by the executive branch in conducting war-
judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfm?id=1727 (testimony of Alberto Gonzales, Attorney General).
The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence declined to investigate the breadth and scope of the
NSA program. See Walter Pincus, Senate Panel Blocks Eavesdropping Probe, WASH. POST, Mar.
8, 2006, at A03, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/03/07/
AR2006030701549.html. The majority of the provisions of the Patriot Act that were due to sunset
were renewed in March 2006. See USA Patriot Act Improvement and Reauthorization Act of
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, 120 Stat. 192 (codified as amended in scattered sections and titles of
the U.S.C.A.). Also in March, Senator Russell Feingold introduced a resolution calling for the
censure of President Bush for authorizing the NSA program. See S. Res. 398, 109th Cong.
(2006), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c109:S.RES.398 (text of censure
resolution); Ed O'Keefe, Feingold Calls for Bush's Censure, ABC NEWS, Mar. 12, 2006, http://
abcnews.go.comr/ThisWeek/Politics/story?id= 1715495&page= 1.
3. It is worth noting that FISA was amended on March 9, 2006, when Congress renewed the
majority of the expiring provisions of the Patriot Act (which itself amended FISA in 2001), but
this did not acknowledge, relate, or respond to the revelation of the NSA program three months
earlier. See USA Patriot Act Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, supra note 2.
Interestingly, few pointed out the contradiction in the administration's position as it applauded the
renewal of major provisions of FISA while simultaneously flouting that same law with its defense
of the NSA program. See infra note 7 and accompanying text; Statement of President George W.
Bush on Passage of Bill to Reauthorize the USA PATRIOT Act (Mar. 9, 2006), http://
www.lifeandliberty.gov/index.html ("I applaud the Senate for voting to renew the Patriot Act and
overcoming the partisan attempts to block its passage.. .. The Patriot Act is vital to the war on
terror and defending our citizens against a ruthless enemy."); Letter from Alberto Gonzales,
Attorney General, to William H. Frist, Majority Leader, United States Senate, Legal Authorities
Supporting the Activities of the National Security Agency Described by the President (Jan. 19,
2006), available at http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps66493/White%20Paper%20on%2ONSA
%20Legal%2OAuthorities.pdf (defending the legality of the NSA program on statutory and
constitutional grounds); Posting of Anonymous Liberal to Unclaimed Territory, http://
glenngreenwald.blogspot.com/2006 03_01_glenngreenwaldarchive.html (Mar. 10, 2006 09:15
EST) ("On Thursday the President once again signed into law a statute - the Patriot Act renewal -
which amends the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). The Patriot Act made many
significant changes to FISA - changes which were made permanent by this bill - but there is one
crucial provision that has not changed; FISA still clearly states that its procedures 'shall be the
exclusive means by which electronic surveillance . . . may be conducted.' In other words, the
President has once again reaffirmed the validity of a law which expressly criminalizes the type of
warrantless surveillance which his administration has been conducting for four and a half years."
(emphasis added)). Indeed, certain provisions of the Act actually strengthened judicial review of
the executive's surveillance authority. See, e.g., USA Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization
Act of 2005, supra note 2, § 106 (strengthening judicial review over the government's ability to
access certain business records under section 215 of the Patriot Act); id. § 108 (strengthening
judicial review over the government's roving wiretap authority under section 206 of the Patriot
Act).
4. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f) (Supp. I 2002).
5. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801-1862 (West 2006)).
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rantless wiretapping,6 was called into severe doubt by the NSA program.
This was so because the NSA program was fundamentally inconsistent
with the core requirement of FISA, namely that an Article III court
authorize foreign intelligence surveillance.7
At the time of this writing, however, it appears that this tension
may now be resolved, as the Bush administration has suddenly and
remarkably reversed its position by agreeing to subject the NSA pro-
gram to court supervision.8 On January 17, 2007, Attorney General
Alberto Gonzales informed the Senate Judiciary Committee that an Arti-
cle III judge issued orders one week earlier authorizing the surveillance
previously conducted under the NSA program.9 The key point here is
the sudden and wholesale reversal by the administration to accept judi-
cial oversight of its surveillance activities.' ° If the administration's
intentions expressed in the Attorney General's letter are indeed sin-
cere,' 1 then the situation should revert back to the status quo - to over
6. See infra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
7. There are two notable exceptions to the requirement of advanced court authorization
under FISA. See 50 U.S.C. § 1802 (2000); 50 U.S.C. § 1805(f) (Supp. 1 2002). Section 1805(f) is
discussed in Part 1I.
8. Eric Lichtblau & David Johnston, Court to Oversee U.S. Wiretapping in Terror Cases,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2007.
9. Letter from Alberto Gonzales, Attorney General, to Patrick Leahy, Chairman, Senate
Judiciary Committee, and Arlen Specter, Ranking Minority Member, Senate Judiciary Committee
(Jan. 17, 2007), http://www.talkingpointsmemo.comldocs/nsa-doj-surveillance/?resultpage=2&t.
At this time, there is no information available regarding the content of these orders, and it is
unclear exactly how the NSA program will be subsumed under the FISA framework. See
Lichtblau & Johnston, supra note 8.
10. See Lara Jakes Jordan, Secret Court to Govern Wiretapping Plan, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Jan. 17, 2007, available at http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20070117/ap-on-go-ca-stpe/
domestic-spying ("The turnaround [comes] after more than a year of stubborn insistence by the
White House that oversight by the secret court was not required by law and, in fact, would be a
hindrance to stopping terrorists.").
11. See Posting of Glenn Greenwald to Unclaimed Territory, http://glenngreenwald.blogspot.
com/ (Jan. 17, 2007, 20:02 EST) ("There is no repentance here, nor (more importantly) is there
any rescission of their claimed powers of lawbreaking. Quite the contrary. Gonazles' letter
affirms, as one would expect, their belief that they were legally entitled to violate this law. That
means (a) that they can violate it again at any future point when they want to, (b) they can violate
other laws under the same theories, and (c) whatever other lawbreaking is already occurring as a
result of those theories is not going to stop."). It has been suggested that the administration's
decision to submit the NSA program to court supervision is designed to both pre-empt upcoming
congressional investigations by the new Democratic majority and moot an appeal pending in the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals of a district court's decision holding the NSA program
unconstitutional. Lichtblau & Johnston, supra note 8; see ACLU v. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754
(E.D. Mich. 2006); Posting of Glenn Greenwald to Unclaimed Territory, supra ("Every time [the
Bush administration] is about to face consequences for their conduct, they stop doing what they
are doing and find another way. When the Supreme Court was about to rule on the legality of
their detention of Jose Padilla, they transferred him to a criminal court and finally charged him,
then told the [Clourt that the questions were 'moot.' When the Supreme Court in Handan
ordered them to give Hamdan (a U.S. citizen) a venue to charge him with a crime and prove his
guilt, they simply let This Extremely Dangerous Terrorist go free instead of charging him. ...
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five years ago, before the NSA program was authorized - with FISA
undoubtedly representing the exclusive means by which the executive
branch may conduct foreign intelligence electronic surveillance within
this country. 2
But throughout 2006, there was a serious push by the administra-
tion and many in Congress for a warrantless electronic surveillance
regime not subject to any judicial review at all. 13  While that push
appears for the moment not to have outlived the November 2006
midterm elections (where the Democrats regained both houses of Con-
gress), this Note nonetheless seizes on this element of disagreement
regarding the role of the judiciary in foreign intelligence electronic sur-
They have not conceded anything and they have certainly not done anything which mitigates their
lawbreaking - their crimes - over the past five years with regard to eavesdropping without
warrants.").
12. Of course, should the executive branch renew the NSA program in the future or authorize
a similar warrantless wiretapping program, this status quo would again be disrupted. See id.; infra
note 13.
In light of this lingering uncertainty surrounding FISA at the time of this writing, the author
feels compelled to point out the enduring value of this Note in the drastic event that FISA is
eliminated or rendered optional. This is the first Note to document the errors in the FISA process
and examine the issue of civil liability in the foreign intelligence electronic surveillance context
since the enactment of FISA. For these reasons, this Note should continue to inform the broader,
long-term debate regarding judicial participation in the foreign intelligence surveillance process.
13. Prior to the November 2006 midterm elections and the Attorney General's January 17
letter, there were at least five proposed bills (representing two distinct camps) that sought to
resolve the tension between the NSA program and FISA. See Electronic Surveillance
Modernization Act, H.R. 5825, 109th Cong. (2006), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/
cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_cong-bills&docid=f:h5825ih.txt.pdf (Wilson); Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance and Improvement Act of 2006, S. 3001, 109th Cong., available at http://
ryansingel.tripod.com/documents/2006/feinsteinspecterbill.pdf (Specter-Feinstein); Lawful
Intelligence and Surveillance of Terrorists Act in an Emergency Act by NSA (LISTEN), H.R.
5371, 109th Cong. (2006), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2006_cr/hr5371.pdf#
search=%22%22HR%20537 1%22%22 (Harman); National Security Surveillance Act of 2006, S.
2453 109th Cong., available at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2006_cr/s2453.html (Specter);
Terrorist Surveillance Act of 2006, S. 2455, 109th Cong., available at http://www.scotusblog.
com/movabletype/archives/DeWinebill.pdf (DeWine). One camp, led by Senator and then-
Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee Arlen Specter proposed repealing the "exclusive
means" language of FISA, thus eviscerating it by making its requirements entirely optional. See
National Security Surveillance Act of 2006, supra, § 801; Posting of Just an Observer to http://
www.haloscan.com/comments/glenngreenwald/l15757928072604291/#23140 (Sept. 6, 2006
11:40 EST) ("The current Specter bill in the Senate, S 2453, as amended in committee [would]
repeal the core requirement of FISA that its procedures and the criminal Wiretap Act (Title III)
,shall be the exlusive [sic] means' for conducting electronic surveillance. The bill essentially
makes FISA optional overall, by explicitly deferring to the President's 'inherent' constitutional
authority instead."). This would have essentially permitted the warrantless wiretapping that
Congress expressly outlawed nearly thirty years ago. The other camp sought to reaffirm the
exclusivity of FISA by making it clear (if it was not already) that warrantless wiretapping outside
the bounds of FISA was prohibited. See, e.g., Foreign Intelligence Surveillance and Improvement
Act of 2006, supra, §§ 101-02. The central disagreement therefore was between those who
sought to maintain judicial involvement in the process and those who wanted to remove the courts
from the process altogether in order to ease the government's task of fighting the War on Terror.
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veillance. It does not do this by discussing the weighty constitutional
issues pertaining to executive power so clearly implicated by the NSA
program. 4 Instead, this Note takes a different route by exposing actual
errors in the FISA process as it has operated over the last five years; it
does so not to argue that FISA should be eliminated but rather to support
the proposition that the degree of judicial participation inherent in the
FISA process must be strengthened. Understanding the nature of the
errors occurring in the FISA process provides insight into how the for-
eign intelligence electronic surveillance process can be improved.
This Note therefore illuminates the broader issue of judicial partici-
pation by examining a narrower issue that has literally gone unnoticed
for the last thirty years: whether it is possible to compensate individuals
who have been victims of unlawful electronic surveillance under
FISA. 15 By focusing on the individuals affected in the process, the nar-
rower issue of civil liability under FISA provides an appropriate lens
through which one can then better examine the broader issue of judicial
participation in the foreign intelligence surveillance process.
The concept of civil liability under FISA cannot be so easily dis-
missed, as FISA itself expressly contemplates such relief.'6 Indeed, 50
U.S.C. § 1810 provides for a civil cause of action for damages against
federal officials. 7 This provision has laid dormant for nearly thirty
years not because there have been no errors in the FISA process, 8 but
14. See generally CONG. RES. SERV., PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT WARRANTLESS
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE TO GATHER FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION (Jan. 5, 2006),
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/mO0506.pdf (analyzing the central statutory and
constitutional issues regarding the NSA program); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LEGAL AUTHORITIES
SUPPORTING THE ACTIVITIES OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY DESCRIBED BY THE PRESIDENT
(2006), http://www.fas.org/irp/nsa/doj0l1906.pdf (defending the legality of the NSA program on
statutory and constitutional grounds); Letter from Alberto Gonzales, Attorney General, to William
H. Frist, Majority Leader, United States Senate (Jan. 19, 2006), http://www.fas.org/irp/nsa/
doj011906.pdf (same); Letter from Constitutional Law Scholars and Former Government
Officials, to Members of Congress (Jan. 9, 2006), http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/doj-
response.pdf (arguing that the NSA program violates FISA and the separation of powers and, if
upheld, would raise serious constitutional questions under the Fourth Amendment); see also
ACLU v. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (holding that the NSA program violates
the First and Fourth Amendments and the separation of powers).
15. The term "unlawful" used throughout is meant to describe electronic surveillance that
violates the statute. This not only includes violations of concrete statutory provisions but
violations of core structural requirements as well. For example, no provision in FISA requires that
the facts presented in an application to the court be accurate, but such a requirement is necessarily
compelled by the structure of FISA. See infra Part III.A. In addition, although there is no
statutory requirement that the electronic surveillance conducted conform to the surveillance
authorized by the court order, such a requirement is necessarily compelled by the statute. See
infra Part III.B.
16. See 50 U.S.C. § 1810 (2000).
17. Id.; see infra Parts II & V.A.
18. See infra Part III
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rather because the victims of these errors have had no way of discover-
ing that they were subject to unlawful electronic surveillance.' 9
This notice problem is perhaps best illustrated by the Brandon
Mayfield incident. During the investigation of the Madrid train bomb-
ings that killed hundreds of people on March 11, 2004, a set of finger-
prints was lifted off of a plastic bag of detonators found at the site. z°
The FBI matched these prints to Brandon Mayfield, an attorney and
Muslim-convert living in Portland, Oregon. Mayfield was then the tar-
get of extensive electronic surveillance and physical searches under
VISA 2' that culminated in his arrest and two week detention. 2 The FBI
"copied four computer hard drives, digitally photographed several docu-
ments, seized ten DNA samples and took approximately 335 digital pho-
tographs of the residence and Mr. Mayfield's property."23 When the
Spanish authorities notified the FBI that its fingerprint analysis was
erroneous, Mayfield was released with an apology from the FBI.
24
This incident, like the violations described in Part III, illustrates
that the government's surveillance powers, even under FISA, are sus-
ceptible to error. One can only imagine the dramatic increase in viola-
tions that would occur under a regime like the NSA program, where the
executive branch has the ability to conduct electronic surveillance free
from judicial scrutiny.
19. See infra Part II.
20. Reauthorization of the USA Patriot Act Before the H. Permanent Select Comm. on
Intelligence, 108th Cong. 18 (2005), available at http://intelligence.house.gov/Media/PDFS/
EdgarTestimony.pdf (statement of Tim Edgar, National Security Policy Counsel, American Civil
Liberties Union).
21. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF THE
FBI's HANDLING OF THE BRANDON MAYFIELD CASE 2 (Jan. 2006), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/s0601/final.pdf [hereinafter A REVIEW OF THE FBI's HANDLING OF
THE BRANDON MAYFIELD CASE] ("As part of the investigation, the FBI obtained authority to
conduct covert electronic surveillance and physical searches of Mayfield pursuant to the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA)."). Although the details of the electronic
surveillance were not disclosed, it is likely that the government used the full extent of its broad
electronic surveillance powers. See In re All Matters, 218 F. Supp. 2d 611, 616-17 (FISA Ct.
2002) ("[I]n many U.S. person electronic surveillances the FBI will be authorized to conduct,
simultaneously, telephone, microphone, cell phone, e-mail and computer surveillance of the U.S.
person target's home, workplace, and vehicles.").
22. Reauthorization of the USA Patriot Act Before the H. Permanent Select Comm. on
Intelligence, supra note 20. See A REvIEw OF THE FBI's HANDLING OF THE BRANDON MAYFIELD
CASE, supra note 21, at 20 (finding no violation of the material witness statute that provided the
basis for Mayfield's detention); but see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, MISUSE OF THE MATERIAL
WITNESS LAW TO HOLD SUSPECTS AS WITNESSES (June 2005), http://hrw.org/reports/2005/us0605/
5.htm#_ftn53 (criticizing, using the Mayfield case as one example, the government's use of the
material witness statute to detain suspected terrorists following September 11, 2001).
23. Reauthorization of the USA Patriot Act Before the H. Permanent Select Comm. on
Intelligence, supra note 20.
24. See Press Release, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Statement on Brandon Mayfield Case
(May 24, 2004), available at http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressre104/mayfield052404.htm.
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Furthermore, the Mayfield incident demonstrates that the only way
that these errors will be brought to light is if the government makes an
arrest. The reason that the Mayfield incident has been perceived as
anomalous is because it is the only known case where the FBI, after
conducting extensive surveillance of the target, was still convinced that
a completely innocent man was a terrorist. As a result, they arrested him
and revealed the existence of the surveillance. Had the FBI discovered
that the fingerprint analysis was erroneous prior to arresting Mayfield,
he simply never would have discovered that he had been the target of
such surveillance. This Note focuses on those individuals who, like
Brandon Mayfield, are subject to unlawful electronic surveillance under
FISA, but who, unlike Mayfield, will not discover that it ever took
place.
I propose the adoption of a statutory remedial scheme designed to
provide compensation to individuals subject to the most grievous
instances of unlawful electronic surveillance. This scheme has two
components. The first component, outlined in Part IV, proposes a return
and notice procedure that allows the court responsible for authorizing
the FISA surveillance to screen for these violations and discretionarily
notify an individual subject to such surveillance. The second compo-
nent, outlined in Part V, establishes a claims procedure, governed by the
same court, designed to affirmatively compensate these individuals in a
manner consistent with both due process and national security concerns.
These proposals calling for the increased involvement of the judici-
ary in the foreign intelligence surveillance process illustrate not only that
the courts, as a practical matter, have an invaluable role to play in
preventing and monitoring the executive's surveillance powers, but also
that they may be put to use in new and creative ways to fulfill their
historic role of safeguarding individual liberties. If the courts are
removed from the equation, these dual objectives become impossible to
achieve.
II. ORIGIN AND BASIC FRAMEWORK OF FISA
FISA was enacted in 197825 to regulate electronic surveillance26
25. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801-1862 (West 2006)).
26. Electronic surveillance is defined as:
I) [Tihe acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device of the
contents of any wire or radio communication sent by or intended to be received by a
particular, known United States person who is in the United States, if the contents
are acquired by intentionally targeting that United States person, under
circumstances in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a
warrant would be required for law enforcement purposes; 2) the acquisition by an
2007]
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used to gather foreign intelligence information.27 FISA sought to strike
a "fair and just balance between protection of national security and pro-
tection of personal liberties."28 It is largely modeled after Title III of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 that regulates
electronic surveillance in the criminal context.29 Title III was enacted in
response to a pair of Supreme Court cases the prior year that recognized
electronic surveillance as a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment3° and required wiretapping statutes to comply with Fourth
Amendment requirements.31
The passage of FISA was motivated by the extensive findings of
the Church Committee in 1976.32 The Church Committee concluded
that the absence of regulation allowed every president since President
Franklin Delano Roosevelt to engage in unbridled electronic surveil-
lance for national security purposes, thus trampling on the rights of
electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device of the contents of any wire
communication to or from a person in the United States, without the consent of any
party thereto, if such acquisition occurs in the United States, but does not include
the acquisition of those communications of computer trespassers that would be
permissible under section 2511 (2)(i) of title 18, United States Code; 3) the
intentional acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device of
the contents of any radio communication, under circumstances in which a person
has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law
enforcement purposes, and if both the sender and all intended recipients are located
within the United States; or 4) the installation or use of an electronic, mechanical, or
other surveillance device in the United States for monitoring to acquire information,
other than from a wire or radio communication, under circumstances in which a
person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for
law enforcement purposes.
50 U.S.C. § 1801(f) (Supp. I 2002).
27. Foreign intelligence information is defined as:
1) [I]nformation that relates to, and if concerning a United States person is
necessary to, the ability of the United States to protect against: a) actual or potential
attack or other grave hostile acts of a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power;
b) sabotage or international terrorism by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign
power; or c) clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or network
of a foreign power or by an agent of a foreign power; or 2) information with respect
to a foreign power or foreign territory that relates to, and if concerning a United
States person is necessary to: a) the national defense or the security of the United
States; or b) the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States.
50 U.S.C. § 1801(e) (2000).
28. S. REP. No. 95-604, pt. 1, at 7 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3904, 3908.
29. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. III, 82 Stat.
197, 211 (current version at 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2510-2522 (West 2006)).
30. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
31. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
32. STAFF REPORT OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITrEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL
OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, 94TH CONG., BOOK 11: INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS (1976), available at http://www.aarclibrary.org/
publib/church/reports/book2/contents.htm.
2007] THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT 401
American citizens and organizations in the process. 33 FISA sought to
"relegate to the past the wire-tapping abuses brought to light during the
[Church] Committee hearings by providing, for the first time, effective
substantive and procedural statutory controls over foreign intelligence
electronic surveillance."34 In doing so, Congress invoked the Supreme
Court's seminal opinion in United States v. United States District Court,
better known as the Keith case, as the basis for crafting a new statute
that would govern electronic surveillance outside the criminal context.35
In a much quoted passage, the Court in Keith stated:
Moreover, we do not hold that the same type of standards and proce-
dures prescribed by Title III are necessarily applicable to this
case.... Given these potential distinctions between Title III criminal
surveillances and those involving domestic security, Congress may
wish to consider protective standards for the latter which differ from
those already prescribed for specified crimes in Title III. Different
standards may be compatible with the Fourth Amendment if they are
reasonable both in relation to the legitimate need of government for
intelligence information and the protected rights of our citizens. For
the warrant application may vary according to the governmental
interest to be enforced and the nature of citizen rights deserving
protection.
3 6
FISA established its own secret Article III court called the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court ("FISC") that is currently composed of
eleven district court judges selected by the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court.37 The FISC sits "in a locked, windowless room with walls of
corrugated steel, in a restricted area of a Justice Department building in
Washington." '38 It reviews applications ex parte, submitted by the
Department of Justice to conduct foreign intelligence surveillance
against foreign powers and agents of a foreign power. 9 FISA also cre-
ated a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review, composed of
three district or circuit court judges selected by the Chief Justice, to
review, also ex parte, the denial of applications submitted to the FISC.4 0
FISA has more recently been amended to provide authority for physical
33. Id.
34. S. REP. No. 95-604, pt. 1, at 15 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3904, 3917.
35. Id. at 13-14, as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3904, 3914-16.
36. United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 322-23 (1972). Although
Keith expressly limited its holding to domestic security intelligence, this case was cited as the
authority to enact such a statute in the foreign intelligence context. See S. REP. No. 95-604, pt. 1,
at 13-15 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3904, 3914-17.
37. 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a) (Supp. I 2002).
38. Nola Breglio, Leaving FISA Behind: The Need to Return to Warrantless Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance, 113 YALE L.J. 179 (2003).
39. See infra notes 47-48.
40. 50 U.S.C. § 1803(b) (2000).
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searches, 4 pen registers and trap and trace devices,42 and access to cer-
tain business records.43
Applications submitted to the-FISC for electronic surveillance must
meet several requirements. All applications must be approved by the
Attorney General"4 and certified by an executive official with national
security responsibilities.45 The central standard for approving applica-
tions is that the FISC must find probable cause4 6 to believe that the tar-
get of the surveillance is a foreign power4 7 or an agent of a foreign
41. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-359, tit. VIII, 108
Stat. 3423, 3443 (current version at 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1821-1829 (West 2006)).
42. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 214, 115 Stat. 272,
286-87 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1846 (Supp. I 2002)), amended by USA Patriot
Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, 120 Stat. 192, 228-29, § 128
(2006).
43. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, § 215, 115 Stat. 272, 287-88 (codified at 50 U.S.C.
§§ 1861-62 (Supp. I 2002)) (amended 2006).
44. 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a) (Supp. I 2002) (amended 2006).
45. Id. § 1804(a)(7).
46. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983) ("The task of the issuing magistrate is
simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth
in the affidavit before him, . . . there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime
will be found in a particular place."); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949) ("In
dealing with probable cause .... as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities. These are
not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which
reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.").
47. Foreign power is defined as:
1) [A] foreign government or any component thereof, whether or not recognized by
the United States; 2) a faction of a foreign nation or nations, not substantially
composed of United States persons; 3) an entity that is openly acknowledged by a
foreign government or governments to be directed and controlled by such foreign
government or governments; 4) a group engaged in international terrorism or
activities in preparation therefore; 5) a foreign-political organization, not
substantially composed of United States persons; or 6) an entity that is directed and
controlled by a foreign government or governments.
50 U.S.C. § 1801(a) (2000).
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power 8 as defined in the statute. 49 The application must also contain
the proposed minimization procedures to be used during the surveillance
that must meet the statutory definition of such procedures. 5' The execu-
tive official submitting the application must also certify "that the pur-
pose of the surveillance is to obtain foreign intelligence information"'"
and "that such information cannot reasonably be obtained by normal
investigative techniques." 52 The FISC will issue the order if it finds that
the above core requirements and all other statutory requirements are
met. The order for electronic surveillance will last "for the period nec-
essary to achieve its purpose, or for ninety days, whichever is less"'5 3 and
"extensions of an order . . . may be granted on the same basis as an
original order . . .. '
FISA also imposes reporting requirements on the executive
48. Agent of a foreign power is defined as:
1) any person other than a United States person, who: A) acts in the United States as
an officer or employee of a foreign power, or as a member of a foreign power as
defined in subsection (a)(4) of this section; B) acts for or on behalf of a foreign
power which engages in clandestine intelligence activities in the United States
contrary to the interests of the United States, when the circumstances of such
person's presence in the United States indicate that such person may engage in such
activities in the United States, or when such person knowingly aids or abets any
person in the conduct of such activities or knowingly conspires with any person to
engage in such activities; or 2) any person who: A) knowingly engages in
clandestine intelligence gathering activities for or on behalf of a foreign power,
which activities involve or may involve a violation of the criminal statutes of the
Untied States; B) pursuant to the direction of an intelligence service or network of a
foreign power, knowingly engages in any other clandestine intelligence activities for
or on behalf of a such foreign power, which activities involve or are about to
involve a violation of the criminal statutes of the United States; C) knowingly
engages in sabotage or international terrorism, or activities that are in preparation
therefor, for or on behalf of a foreign power; D) knowingly enters the United States
under a false or fraudulent identity for or on behalf of a foreign power or, while in
the United States, knowingly assumes a false or fraudulent identity for or on behalf
of a foreign power; or E) knowingly aids or abets any person in the conduct of
activities described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C) or knowingly conspires with
any person to engage in activities described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C).
Id. § 1801(b).
49. This standard has generally been recognized as more lenient than the traditional probable
cause standard that the target is or is about to commit a crime. See S. REP. No. 95-701, at 12
(1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3973, 3980 ("The international character of foreign
terrorist activities fully supports the more flexible probable cause standard .
50. § 1804(a)(5); see id. § 1801(h); infra Parts III.A. & IV.
51. 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(b) (Supp. I 2002); see infra note 64 and accompanying text.
52. 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(c) (2000).
53. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1805(e)(1) (West 2006). When the target is a foreign power, the order may
last for one year. Id. § 1805(e)(2). Some orders against agents of foreign powers may last up to
120 days. See id. § 1805(e)(l)(B).
54. Id. § 1805(e)(2). There is an exception for the targets described supra note 53, where
extensions may be granted for up to one year. Id.
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branch.55 Each year, the Attorney General must inform Congress of "the
total number of applications made for orders and extensions of orders
approving electronic surveillance under this subchapter; and the total
number of such orders and extensions either granted, modified, or
denied." 56 The Attorney General is also required, on a semi-annual
basis, to "fully inform" the Select Committees on Intelligence in the
House of Representatives and the Senate on the criminal cases in which
information gathered has been shared and authorized for use at trial.57
III. THE NOTICE PROBLEM
As mentioned at the outset, FISA provides for a civil cause of
action for damages against federal officials.58 Unlike many civil actions
that may simply be invoked by a plaintiff whenever the proper condi-
tions permit, the cause of action in section 1810 requires implementing
legislation. Because those subject to unlawful electronic surveillance
will never discover that they are under surveillance, they are incapable
of bringing the action even when circumstances would allow. When
enacting Title III, Congress recognized this need for implementing legis-
lation by crafting a general notice provision in order to make the analo-
gous Title III cause of action meaningful. 59 "It is expected that civil
suits, if any, will instead grow out of the filing of [notice] inventories
under section 2518(8)(d)."60 By contrast, FISA provides for notice only
in narrow circumstances that are incapable of effectuating the statutory
cause of action in section 1810.
First, FISA provides for notice of the fact that electronic surveil-
lance has occurred when the government intends to introduce the fruits
of that surveillance in a federal or state criminal proceeding. 6 Those
who receive such notice have a statutory suppression remedy and may
challenge the legality of the FISA surveillance before a judge.6 2
FISA differs from Title III, however, in that FISA was designed as
55. Id. §§ 1807-1808.
56. 50 U.S.C. § 1807 (2000).
57. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1808(a) (West 2006).
58. 50 U.S.C. § 1810 (2000).
59. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) (2000) (notice provision); 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (2000) (providing
for recovery of civil damages).
60. S. REP. No. 90-1097, at 2196 (1968).
61. 50 U.S.C. § 1806(c)-(d) (2000).
62. The court will suppress such evidence if it is "unlawfully acquired" or if the "surveillance
was not made in conformity with an order of authorization or approval." Id. § 1806(e). If the
Attorney General files an affidavit swearing that disclosure of the order or any contents of the
surveillance to the defendant would harm national security, the judge will review the legality of
the surveillance in camera and ex parte. Id. § 1806(f).
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a tool for gathering foreign intelligence as opposed to incriminating
evidence:
Although there may be cases in which information acquired from a
foreign intelligence surveillance will be used as evidence of a crime,
these cases are expected to be relatively few in number, unlike Title
III interceptions the very purpose of which is to obtain evidence of
criminal activity.
6 3
Although the Patriot Act's amendments to FISA now allow the govern-
ment's primary purpose to be gathering incriminating evidence 64 and
permit increased coordination between intelligence officers and law
enforcement, 65 it is still often unwise to prosecute an agent of a foreign
power who is successfully being monitored under FISA:
And there are costs associated with the prosecution of somebody
using FISA information. Chief among them, you have to reveal pub-
licly the fact that there has been FISA surveillance, and that if there
are others out there who are not being prosecuted, they are then
alerted to the fact that the Government is on to the conspiracy....
[A]nd there are also other concerns that arise when you prosecute an
intelligence case involving protection of source and method informa-
tion, and a variety of other concerns. And just as a tactical matter,
sometimes prosecution is not the right way to go. Other times you
just want to monitor these people or do something else. You try to
recruit one of them as a double agent. You feed them false informa-
tion. You disrupt them using some other technique. In some cases
you do want to prosecute.66
In addition, since September 11, 2001, the FBI has undergone
a broad transformation aimed at focusing the agency on terrorism and
intelligence-related matters. . . . [OIG has] found that the FBI's
investigative efforts [have been] generally consistent with its post-9/
11 priorities and that the FBI [is] performing less work in certain
traditional criminal investigative areas and more work in matters
related to terrorism.
67
63. S. Rep. No. 95-604, pt. 1, at 39 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N 3904, 3940.
64. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review interpreted section 218 of the
Patriot Act in In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 735-36 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002), to allow the
government's primary purpose, when conducting electronic surveillance under FISA, to be
gathering evidence of a crime as long as gathering foreign intelligence information was still a
significant purpose. See 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(B) (Supp. I 2002) ("a certification ... that a
significant purpose of the surveillance is to obtain foreign intelligence information").
65. See 50 U.S.C. § 403-5d (Supp. I 2002).
66. The USA Patriot Act in Practice: Shedding Light on the FISA Process Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2002), http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2002_hr/
091002transcript.html (statement of David Kris, Associate Deputy Attorney General, U.S.
Department of Justice) (emphasis added).
67. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, AUDIT REPORT No. 05-37,
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This reprioritization has led to a significant reduction in the number of
criminal investigations and prosecutions initiated. OIG found that the
FBI opened 28,331 fewer criminal cases in fiscal year (FY) 2004 than it
had in FY 2000, a 45-percent reduction. During FY 2000, the FBI initi-
ated 67,782 criminal investigations, while in FY 2004 the number of
investigations declined to 34,451.68
These strategic concerns and reprioritization efforts supplement the
conclusion that, absent another Brandon Mayfield incident, this notice
provision will never be triggered in situations where innocent individu-
als have been subject to unlawful electronic surveillance. These individ-
uals will not face criminal prosecution necessary to trigger the notice
provision and will therefore never become aware that they have been
subject to surveillance.
FISA also contains a notice provision in its subchapter governing
physical searches which provides that:
[A]t any time after the search the Attorney General determines there
is no national security interest in continuing to maintain the secrecy
of the search, the Attorney General shall provide notice to the United
States person whose residence was searched of the fact of the search
conducted pursuant to this chapter and shall identify any property of
such person seized, altered, or reproduced during such search.
6 9
When the government takes the position, as it did in the Mayfield case,
that a "mistake does not mean the government should be required to
disclose its spying techniques and tactics," and that "[t]hose things deal
with national security and should be kept secret, even when their target
is found to be innocent,"7 this notice provision will never be used.
Despite this apparent unfettered discretion vested in the Attorney Gen-
eral, there is no analogous provision applicable to electronic surveillance
under FSA where the secrecy of the surveillance is determined to pose
no threat to national security.
FISA also permits the Attorney General to conduct electronic sur-
veillance under his own authority if there is an emergency situation
where going to the FISC would present too much of a delay.7' This
emergency surveillance is authorized as long as the FISC is informed at
the time it is authorized by the Attorney General, the standard factual
THE EXTERNAL EFFECTS OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION'S REPRIORITIZATION
EFFORTS (2005), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/reports/FBI/aO537/final.pdf.
68. Id. at v.
69. 50 U.S.C. § 1825(b) (2000); see infra note 161 and accompanying text.
70. Joseph Rose, Judge Gives Mayfield Ok on Challenge to Patriot Act: The Ruling Orders
the FBI to Release Information About Spying and Retains Monetary Claims, THE OREGONIAN,
July 29, 2005, at A01, available at http://www.westlaw.com (search "2005 WLNR 23960027").
71. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(f) (Supp. I 2002).
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bases for such surveillance exist, the minimization procedures are fol-
lowed, and an application is submitted to the FISC at the end of seventy
two hours.72 If subsequent approval by the FISC is not obtained at the
end of those seventy two hours, the notice provision is triggered.73 It
provides that:
[T]he judge shall cause to be served on any United States person
named in the application and on such other United States persons
subject to electronic surveillance as the judge may determine in his
discretion it is in the interest of justice to serve, notice of: 1) the fact
of the application; 2) the period of the surveillance; and 3) the fact
that during the period information was or was not obtained. On an ex
parte showing of good cause to the judge the serving of the notice
required by this subsection may be postponed or suspended for a
period not to exceed ninety days. Thereafter, on a further ex parte
showing of good cause, the court shall forego ordering the serving of
the notice required under this subsection."
This notice provision applies only to those narrow situations where the
Attorney General has authorized emergency electronic surveillance and
no subsequent approval by the FISC is obtained. In this respect, it is
worth noting that the FISC has only denied a total of six applications out
of the near twenty thousand submitted over the last twenty seven
years.75 Disagreements between the FISC and the executive over an
application have recently resulted in modification instead of denial.76
Regardless of whatever inferences one draws from this, the conclusion is
that the only way that those subject to unlawful electronic surveillance
can be notified is when the emergency surveillance is so grievously erro-
neous as to provoke one of these extraordinary denials by the FISC.
The emergency notice provision above is modeled after a very sim-
ilar provision located in Title III.7" In fact, the two provisions are nearly
identical, except for one major difference in scope. Title III's notice
provision applies not only to retroactive denials of emergency electronic
surveillance but to all electronic surveillance that has been completed.78
It is triggered "[w]ithin a reasonable time but not later than ninety days
after the filing of an application for an order of approval under [Title
III's emergency surveillance provision] which is denied or the termina-
72. Id.
73. 50 U.S.C. § 18060) (2000).
74. Id.
75. FISA Annual Reports to Congress, http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/#rept.
76. The FISC has increasingly modified applications over the last two years. It substantively
modified ninety-four applications in 2004 and seventy-nine in 2003, but only a total of eight in all
prior years. Id.
77. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) (2000).
78. Id.
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tion of the period of an order or extensions thereof. . . ."" Like the
emergency notice provision in FISA, this provision requires a judge to
notify any named person in the application and permits the judge to
notify any other person subject to the surveillance if it is in the interest
of justice.8 ° Such a provision is therefore capable of providing notice to
those who are erroneously named in an application or those otherwise
subject to unlawful surveillance. As noted above, this general notice
provision was drafted in order to effectuate Title III's civil liability pro-
vision.81 Despite enacting an analogous civil action in FISA ten years
later, Congress neglected to provide a notice provision similarly capable
of effectuating the statutory cause of action.
While it is certainly awkward to have a cause of action incapable of
being utilized, it becomes unacceptable when the cause of action is inca-
pable of remedying concrete statutory violations. The question then
becomes whether such statutory violations are occurring.
IV. ERRORS IN THE FISA PROCESS
Neither the general public nor the victims of unlawful electronic
surveillance have any knowledge regarding the frequency with which
such surveillance occurs. Although this secrecy necessarily makes the
following description incomplete, the errors in the FISA process that
have been revealed to the public have been severe and are likely to recur
in the future.
A. Application Process
In the FISC's first and only published opinion, it wrote:
In September 2000, the government came forward to confess error in
some 75 FISA applications .... The errors related to misstatements
and omissions of material facts .... After receiving a more detailed
explanation from the Department of Justice about what went wrong,
but not why, the Court decided not to accept inaccurate affidavits
from FBI agents whether or not intentionally false. One FBI agent
was barred from appearing before the Court as a FISA affiant.82
These errors involved violations of minimization procedures that
imposed an informational "wall" between FBI intelligence investigators
and criminal prosecutors.83
79. Id. (emphasis added).
80. Id.
81. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
82. In re All Matters, 218 F. Supp. 2d 611, 620-21 (FISA Ct. 2002).
83. See Memorandum from Janet Reno, Attorney General on Procedures for Contacts
Between the FBI and Criminal Division Concerning Foreign Intelligence and Foreign
Counterintelligence Investigations (July 19, 1995), http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/
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The wall prevented criminal prosecutors and investigators from
directing foreign intelligence investigations.84 For instance, "the gov-
ernment's misstatements and omissions in FISA applications and viola-
tions of the court's orders involved information sharing and
unauthorized disseminations to criminal investigators and prosecu-
tors."85 Despite the fact that such information sharing is currently per-
missible under the Patriot Act and the government's revised
minimization procedures,86 the errors were quite serious at the time
because the wall was thought to be what saved FISA from violating the
Fourth Amendment.87 The FISA Court of Review disagreed, holding
that FISA, as amended by the Patriot Act, did not violate the Fourth
Amendment.88 Prior to the Patriot Act and the new minimization proce-
dures, however, the errors related to material omissions in the sense that
had the FISC known of these violations at the time, they would not have
issued the application as presented. So despite the fact that the DOJ had
successfully obtained a FISA order, the electronic surveillance con-
ducted pursuant to the order would have been unlawful because the syn-
thesis of the initial application violated the minimization procedures.89
1995procs.html. "The 1995 Procedures formalized the unwritten policy that had existed since the
1980s requiring the Criminal Division, rather than the local USAO, to be consulted about
intelligence investigations when questions of criminal activity or criminal prosecution arose."
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF THE FBI's
HANDLING OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION RELATED TO THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS (Nov.
2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/specialV0506/final.pdf. This policy arose in
response to a number of federal appellate decisions requiring the "primary purpose" of a FISA
investigation to be gathering foreign intelligence information. See, e.g., United States v. Truong
Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980); United States v. Johnson, 952 F.2d 565 (1st Cir. 1991);
United States v. Pelton, 835 F.2d 1067 (4th Cir. 1987). The executive became concerned that any
information obtained in violation of the primary purpose standard would be inadmissible in a
criminal proceeding.
84. All Matters, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 619-20 ("The Criminal Division may then consult with the
FBI and give guidance to the FBI aimed at preserving the option of criminal prosecution, but may
not direct or control the FISA investigation toward law enforcement objectives.").
85. Id. at 621.
86. See id. at 621-22; supra notes 64-65.
87. See All Matters, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 620 ("In order to preserve both the appearance and the
fact that FISA surveillances and searches were not being used sub rosa for criminal investigations,
the Court routinely approved the use of information screening "walls" proposed by the
government in its applications, where ... FBI criminal investigators and Department prosecutors
were not allowed to review all of the raw FISA intercepts or seized materials lest they become de
facto partners in the FISA surveillances and searches."); see also David Hardin, The Fuss over
Two Small Words: The Unconstitutionality of the USA Patriot Act Amendments to FISA Under the
Fourth Amendment, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 291 (2003); Michael P. O'Connor & Celia Rumann,
Emergency and Anti-Terrorist Powers: Going, Going, Gone: Sealing the Fate of the Fourth
Amendment, 26 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1234 (2003); George P. Varghese, A Sense of Purpose: The
Role of Law Enforcement in Foreign Intelligence Surveillance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 385 (2003).
88. In re Sealed Case, 301 F.3d 717, 746 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002).
89. See 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(4) (2000).
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Just as the minimization procedures play a fundamental role in the
FISA process, so too does the accuracy of the substantive information
forming the basis of the FISA application. As one FBI attorney
acknowledged: "It is imperative that the facts contained in FISA declara-
tions are accurate." 9 If the facts are not accurate, this will unacceptably
taint the FISC's probable cause determination regarding whether the
individual is an agent of a foreign power. The agent of a foreign power
standard is the linchpin of FISA, and if the probable cause determination
is based on inaccurate facts, the corresponding surveillance must be con-
sidered unlawful.9
Although the FISC opinion described omissions relating to the
unauthorized sharing of information, even prior to the FISC opinion the
government independently acknowledged that their methods to ensure
the accuracy of FISA applications were inadequate. Deputy Attorney
General David Kris testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee that:
The main challenge to accuracy in FISA applications is that the FBI
agent who signs the affidavit describing the investigation for the
court is not the agent who actually conducts the investigation....
And that is where inaccuracy can creep in: If the headquarters agent
has a miscommunication with the agents in the field, his affidavit will
be inaccurate.92
In order to prevent these inaccuracies, the FBI adopted the Woods Pro-
cedures in April 2001.93 The preface of these procedures states: "The
goal of the procedures set out below is to ensure accuracy with regard to
• . .the specific facts supporting probable cause for the authority." 94
These procedures are detailed, but generally require information sharing
between the field office and headquarters and confirmation that the tar-
get is neither the subject of an ongoing criminal investigation nor an FBI
informant.95
The Senate Judiciary Committee reviewed these procedures, how-
ever, and concluded that: "Even the much touted 'Woods Procedures'
governing the procedures to be followed by FBI personnel in preparing
FISA applications do not require Headquarters personnel to conduct
even the most basic subject matter computer searches or checks as part
90. E-mail from Michael Woods, National Security Law Unit, FBI Office of the General
Counsel, to All Field Offices, at 2 (Apr. 5, 2001) [hereinafter E-mail from Michael Woods], http://
www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/woods.pdf.
91. See supra note 15.
92. The USA Patriot Act in Practice: Shedding Light on the FISA Process Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 66.
93. E-mail from Michael Woods, supra note 90.
94. Id. at 2.
95. Id.
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of the preparation and review of FISA applications. '"96 The Committee,
in a set of written questions addressed to FBI Director Robert Mueller,
noted that the background checks required inputting only the target's
name and not a general subject matter search.9 7 In addition, the field
office is primarily responsible for conducting this research and the Com-
mittee noted that their computers do not always have the same degree of
access as those at headquarters.98 And finally, the Committee asked: "Is
it intended that the Woods Procedures be the extent of the investigation
in connection with the preparation of a FISA application, or is it
expected that the field agents and headquarters unit will pursue all nec-
essary and logical leads, including a basic key word search?"99
Acknowledging that the FBI computer system will not always contain
all of the relevant information, the FBI responded that the Woods Proce-
dures "in no way constitute the extent of the investigation in connection
with the preparation of a FISA application."'" So although the Woods
Procedures help formalize the application process by providing a check-
list for agents to follow, they do not preclude factual inaccuracies from
permeating the application on which the probable cause determination
depends.
Not only can miscommunication and inadequate research lead to
factual inaccuracies forming the basis of a FISA application, but so too
can errors in the investigative process. The erroneous fingerprint analy-
sis in the Mayfield case is a prime example of this. After conducting an
investigation of the incident, the Office of the Inspector General "con-
cluded that the FBI's field investigation of Mayfield was initiated
because of and largely driven by the identification of his fingerprint on
evidence associated with the train bombings . . . ."I" Even after the
Mayfield incident and its negative publicity, systemic performance
problems relating to latent fingerprint analysis still represent a potential
source of factual inaccuracy. 10 2 Although the investigation acknowl-
edged that the FBI Laboratory has initiated some significant reforms, it
96. FISA Implementation Failures Before S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2003),
available at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2003_rpt/fisa.html.
97. Interim Report on FBI Oversight in the 107th Congress by the Senate Judiciary
Committee: FISA Implementation Failures Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong.
(2002) (written answers by William Moschella, Assistant Attorney General, in response to
questions addressed to Robert Mueller, FBI Director, by Sen. Patrick Leahy, at 10), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/fbi082903.pdf.
98. Id. at 11.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. A REVIEW OF THE FBI's HANDLING OF THE BRANDON MAYFIELD CASE, supra note 21, at
18.
102. Id. at 20 ("While we did not find any intentional misconduct by FBI employees, either in
the Laboratory or by those conducting the FBI field investigation, we did find performance issues
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"found that the actions proposed by the Laboratory were not fully
responsive to the issues raised by the Mayfield misidentification and that
additional or more specific modifications to Laboratory practices should
be adopted."'' 0 3 In sum, miscommunication, poor research, fingerprint
errors, and other forensic mistakes may all contribute to factual inaccu-
racies in a FISA application that will unacceptably taint the probable
cause determination, thus rendering the corresponding surveillance
unlawful.
B. Implementation Process
1. INTERNAL FBI COMMUNICATIONS: APRIL 2000
Two brief internal FBI communications written in April 2000 pro-
vide a rare and privileged glimpse into the FISA implementation pro-
cess. The first is a moderately redacted e-mail dated April 5, 2000,
describing a technological error involving electronic surveillance." °
The second, dated April 14, is a more comprehensive memorandum
directed to "All Field Offices," entitled "Caution on FISA Issues," and
released more than two years after the FBI recognized the severe
problems described in the memo.
10 5
Unlike application errors that affect the validity of a FISA order,
the examples that follow are unlawful in the sense that the target or type
of surveillance described in the application and approved by the FISC
did not correspond to the surveillance that was actually conducted. 10 6 In
other words, although the FISA order may have been valid, the imple-
mentation of that order was erroneous.
The April 14 memorandum begins:
In the first quarter of the year 2000, different field offices have
encountered difficulties in their management of electronic surveil-
lances and physical searches authorized under FISA. After one quar-
ter of reporting we are aware of potential violations numbering three
and one-half times those reported in 1999. Examples of problems
encountered follow.' 
0 7
by various FBI employees. Most significantly, we found a series of systemic issues, particularly
in the FBI Laboratory, that helped cause the errors in the Mayfield case.").
103. Id. at 14.
104. E-mail from [Redacted], to Spike (Marion) Bowman (Apr. 5, 2000, 17:29 EST)
[hereinafter E-mail from [Redacted]], http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/del061402.pdf.
105. Memorandum from FBI Counterterrorism Division, Office of General Counsel, to All
Field Offices (Apr. 14, 2000) [hereinafter Memorandum from FBI Counterterrorism Division],
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/ec.pdf.
106. See supra note 15.
107. Memorandum from FBI Counterterrorism Division, supra note 105.
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It is useful to quote the examples described at length in order to properly
illustrate the nature of these errors. Two examples follow:
In one case, a field office secured a FISA which had to be imple-
mented by a second field office. The second field office implemented
the FISA order incorrectly, and videotaped a meeting even though
videotaping was not authorized in the FISA order.... In [another]
example, a target's E-mail was correctly intercepted under a FISA
order. When time came to renew the FISA, the field office decided
to omit E-mail coverage since the coverage was not productive.
Thus, the FISA renewal order did not cover E-mail. The field office
then continued to cover the target's E-mail even though there was no
authorization for E-mail coverage in the FISA renewal order.'1 8
When one asks how these errors occurred, the implications extend
beyond unauthorized videotaping and e-mail coverage. The most likely
explanation is that the executing official simply did not read the FISA
order carefully. This assumption is supported by a later portion of the
same FBI memorandum: "It is important that field offices read carefully
every FISA package and not assume that the FISA packages are similar,
[or] have the same authorities. . . . Every FISA package must be
assumed to be unique and read in its entirety by agents responsible for
the investigation."'"09 Failure to meticulously read an order will
undoubtedly lead to surveillance that has not been authorized by the
FISC.
Another example describes the following error:
In another investigation, a field office secured a FISA order which
authorized the coverage of a target's cell phone. Unknown to the
field office, some time after the FISA order, the target gave up his
cell phone, and the target's cell phone number was assigned by the
cell phone carrier to a new person. The new owner of the cell phone
spoke a language other than the language spoken by the target of the
FISA. When the language specialist listened to the FISA tape, and
heard a new language, the specialist reported it to the agent working
the case. Nothing was done for a substantial period of time, and
timely reported [sic] was not made to FBIHQ. The new owner of the
cell phone number was therefore the target of unauthorized elec-
tronic surveillance for a substantial period of time." 0
Although the controversial roving wiretap provision was enacted to
respond to these kinds of evasive terrorist tactics,"' the above example
108. Id. (emphasis added).
109. Id.
110. Id. (emphasis added).
111. See United and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, § 206, 115 Stat. 272, 282
(codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1805(c)(2)(B) (Supp. I 2002)), amended by USA Patriot Improvement
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represents a serious failure to minimize the acquisition of non-foreign
intelligence information by continuing to monitor someone who was
known not to be the agent of a foreign power named in the order.' 12
The memo then briefly adds without explanation that "[o]ther
examples include unauthorized searches, incorrect addresses, incorrect
interpretation of a FISA order and overruns of [electronic surveil-
lance].""' 3 Not only does this sentence suggest that the examples above
are not isolated incidents, but it also indicates that more severe errors,
such as conducting electronic surveillance of the wrong home, have
occurred as well.
The e-mail of April 5 provides another concrete example of unau-
thorized surveillance and introduces technology as the source of this
error:
The FBI technical people went to install the FBI software .. .to
accomplish the electronic surveillance on March 16. The software
was turned on and did not work correctly. The FBI software not only
picked up the e-mails under the electronic surveillance of the FBI
target ... but also picked up e-mails on non-covered targets ....
[Office of Intelligence and Policy Review (OIPR) of the DOJ] was
never told that the FBI software was experimental. OIPR was
informed that it would work .... When you add this story to the
FISA mistakes covered in the [April 14 memo] prepared to go to the
field ... you have a pattern of occurrences which indicate to OIPR an
inability on the part of the FBI to manage its FISAs.
114
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of technological malfunction is the
inability to predict when it will occur. Steps can be taken to ensure that
technological devices are tested before being employed, but such mea-
and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, 120 Stat. 192, 195, 203-04, §§ 102(b), 108
(2006) (codified as amended in scattered sections and titles of the U.S.C.A.). Instead of
identifying the particular device that an agent of a foreign power will be using, roving wiretaps
authorize electronic surveillance of a particular target and the devices that he may use. This
makes it unnecessary for the government to return to the FISC every time the agent of a foreign
power changes cell phones. Some have argued that both this provision, and the Title Ill provision
after which it is modeled, violate the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement. See Kelly R.
Cusick, Thwarting Ideological Terrorism: Are We Brave Enough to Maintain Civil Liberties in
the Face of Terrorist Induced Trauma?, 35 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 55, 75 (2003); Bryan R.
Faller, The 1998 Amendment to the Roving Wiretap Statute: Congress "Could Have" Done Better,
60 OHo ST. L.J. 2093, 2093 (1999).
112. See 50 U.S.C. § 1805(c)(2)(a) (Supp. 1 2002) ("An order approving an electronic
surveillance under this section shall direct that the minimization procedures be followed.").
113. Memorandum from FBI Counterterrorism Division, supra note 105.
114. E-mail from [Redacted], supra note 104 (emphasis added). It should also be noted that
technological deficiencies are not limited to the FBI but extend to the service providers that assist
the FBI with electronic surveillance. See infra note 118 and accompanying text. These service
providers are shielded from liability in connection with these services. See 50 U.S.C. § 1805(i)
(Supp. I 2002).
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sures cannot eliminate technology as a potential and perhaps inevitable
source of error.
2. SIMILAR ERRORS REVEALED FIVE YEARS LATER: SEPTEMBER 2005
Demonstrating that the errors described above are likely to recur,
on September 30, 2005, the Associated Press released an article entitled
Wrong Number: FBI Says it Makes Mistakes in National Security Wire-
taps. 115 In this article, the FBI admitted again to problems nearly identi-
cal to those identified in the April communications.
With respect to technological errors, and making the counterintui-
tive point that improvements in technology will actually make it more
difficult to conduct accurate surveillance, the general counsel for the
Electronic Privacy Information Center observed that "technological
advances have made it harder, not easier, to 'conduct wiretapping in a
surgical way' because digital communications often carry many conver-
sations. It's not like the old days when there was one dedicated line
between me and you.""' 6 The FBI admitted that "38,514 untranslated
hours [of FISA intercepts] included an undetermined number from what
the FBI called 'collections of materials from the wrong sources due to
technical problems.' ''17
The article further revealed additional instances of unauthorized
surveillance. Where "the tap was placed on a telephone number other
than the one authorized by the court," for example, was attributed to "an
instance in which the telephone company hooked us up to the wrong
number or a clerical error [that] gives us the wrong number."' 18 Clerical
errors therefore present an obvious, additional source of error that is also
systematically difficult to prevent. An "0" instead of a "0", for exam-
ple, can result in the unauthorized surveillance of the wrong phone num-
ber, address, or e-mail account.
Regardless of what steps may be taken to heighten prevention of
the implementation errors described in this section, the last five years
have demonstrated that these errors may simply be inevitable casualties
of foreign intelligence surveillance. (Again, one can only imagine the
115. Mark Sherman, Wrong Number: FBI Says it Makes Mistakes in National Security
Wiretaps, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 30, 2005, at 1, available at http://www.oppression.org/cgi-
bin/viewnews.cgicategory=4&id= 1128143231.
116. Id.
117. Id. (emphasis added); see generally OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, REPORT No. 04-25, THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION'S FOREIGN LANGUAGE
PROGRAM - TRANSLATION OF COUNTERTERRORISM AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FOREIGN
LANGUAGE MATERIAL (July 2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/reports/FBIa0425/
index.htm#note (auditing the FBI's ability to translate critical foreign language material derived
from FISA in a manner consistent with the Bureau's priorities).
118. Sherman, supra note 115.
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extent of the violations if there was no judicial oversight. "Imagine" is
the appropriate word here, because without the FISC, there would have
been no impetus for the government to reveal any errors.) This conclu-
sion supports the adoption of affirmative measures designed to provide
relief to those who are victims of such errors.
V. RETURN AND NOTICE PROCEDURE
It is indisputable that the government cannot be in the business of
informing suspected terrorists that they are being monitored. "If the
existence of these searches were known to the foreign power targets,
they would alter their activities to render the information useless.
Accordingly, a notice requirement, such as exists in the criminal law,
would be fatal.""' 9  Nor would it be appropriate to inform those with
connections to an agent of a foreign power that they had been subject to
surveillance for the same reason.
FISA's emergency notice provision is puzzling in light of this con-
cern. As noted above, the emergency notice is triggered when a subse-
quent order approving emergency surveillance is not obtained.
20
Failure to obtain a subsequent order may be due to the denial of an
application by the FISC or to the failure of the executive to submit an
application at the end of the seventy-two hours as required by section
1805(f).12 ' The first thing to note is that if the FISC denies the subse-
quent application after emergency surveillance, undoubtedly a rare
event, 2 the FISC would be required to notify any United States per-
119. Warrantless Physical Searches Conducted in the U.S. for Foreign Intelligence Before the
H. Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 103rd Cong. 3-4 (1994) (statement of James S.
Gorelick, Deputy Attorney General), available at http://www.cnss.org/Gorelicktestimony.pdf. In
the criminal context, notice is a constitutional component of the Warrant Clause of the Fourth
Amendment. See Berger [sic] v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 60 (1967) ("[The New York
wiretapping statute] has no requirement for notice as do conventional warrants, nor does it
overcome this defect by requiring some showing of special facts."). In discussing the proposed
Title III notice provision, Senator Hart stated: "'The Berger [sic] and Katz [sic] decisions
established that notice of surveillance is a constitutional requirement of any surveillance statute. It
may be that the required notice must be served on all parties to intercepted communications."'
United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 430 (1977) (quoting 114 Cong. Rec. S14485-86 (1968)
(statement of Sen. Hart)). If this was true with respect to foreign intelligence surveillance, there
could be no effective foreign intelligence surveillance statute that complied with the Constitution.
The lack of notice in FISA finds constitutional support in the rationale of the passage in Keith that
flexibly construes the warrant requirement as one that may vary with new governmental interests.
See supra note 36 and accompanying text; infra note 127. To be clear, this Note does not contend
that the Fourth Amendment requires notice in the foreign intelligence context.
120. 50 U.S.C. § 18060) (2000).
121. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(0 (Supp. I 2002). It is not clear how notice is to be served in
emergency surveillance cases without a return procedure making the surveillance available to the
FISC. It is likely, although unknowable, that this notice provision has never been triggered.
122. Supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
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son12 3 named in the application, 124 who may be an agent of a power. 12 5
The FISC would also have discretion to notify any United States person
not named in the subsequent application who is subject to the surveil-
lance if it is in the interest of justice, subject to an ex parte showing of
good cause by the government. 26 This again may include agents of a
foreign power or those connected to an agent of a foreign power.
Although the FISC would not choose to notify such individuals, the
point is that the discretion to do so has been vested with the FISC in
emergency surveillance situations, and no such discretion exists in ordi-
nary FISA cases.
It is not clear why, based on checks and balances, such discretion
should be foreclosed for victims of unlawful surveillance in the typical
FISA case. Emergency surveillance is suspect because the Attorney
General acts as the FISC, thus removing the check on executive power.
If this is the rationale for providing notice in emergency cases then it
should follow that surveillance conducted pursuant to an invalid order
(application errors) or surveillance that is not authorized by an order
(implementation errors) should trigger a notice provision as well. In
these cases, there is similarly no effective check on the executive
branch. With respect to application errors, the FISC cannot act as a
check when it unknowingly approves FISA orders based on, for exam-
ple, inaccurate facts. With respect to implementation errors, the FISC
cannot act as an effective check after the order has been issued and the
executive does not conduct the surveillance as authorized. Triggering
notice only when the FISC has not retroactively approved emergency
surveillance, but not when there has been an application or implementa-
tion error, is inconsistent with principles of checks and balances.
The legislative history does not offer an explanation for why notice
is provided only in emergency cases (aside from the general need for
123. See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(i) (2000) ("'United States person' means a citizen of the United
States, an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence (as defined in section 1 101(a)(20) of
title 8), an unincorporated association a substantial number of members of which are citizens of
the United States or aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence, or a corporation which is
incorporated in the United States, but does not include a corporation or an association which is a
foreign power, as defined in subsection (a)(1), (2), or (3) of this section.").
124. § 1806().
125. See SEN. REP. No. 95-604, pt. 1, at 59 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3904,
3960 ("The failure to obtain [FISC] approval ... need not be based on a determination by the
court that the target is not an agent of a foreign power .... Failure to secure a warrant could be
based on a number of other factors, such as an improper certification."). Simply making such
notice discretionary can cure this flaw in the statute.
126. § 1806(j). In situations where no subsequent application was submitted to the FISC
within seventy-two hours as required by section 1805(f), then this discretion would also seemingly
apply to all United States persons subject to the surveillance. Id.; but see supra note 121.
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secrecy in all foreign intelligence surveillance). 27 The closest explana-
tion is the following passage:
A requirement of notice in all [emergency surveillance] cases would
have the potential of compromising the fact that the government had
focused an investigation on the target. Even where the target is not,
in fact, an agent of a foreign power, given [sic] notice to the person
may result in compromising an on-going foreign intelligence investi-
gation because of the logical inferences a foreign intelligence service
might draw from the targeting of the individual. For these reasons,
the government is given the opportunity to present its case to the
judge for initially postponing notice.'2
But this passage explains why notice cannot be provided to everyone
subject to emergency surveillance, not why only a notice provision was
provided for emergency surveillance. The same explanation applies in
the instance where notice cannot be given to everyone subject to elec-
tronic surveillance under FISA in general, even those who are not agents
of a foreign power, such as the spouse who is oblivious to her husband's
terrorist activities. In that case, the spouse could not be notified because
it would be functionally equivalent to notifying the agent of a foreign
power himself.
The issue then is whether an analogous mechanism to the return
and notice procedure of Title III could operate in the FISA context. To
cure one of the defects of the New York wiretapping statute invalidated
in Berger v. New York,129 the first step under the Title III return and
notice procedure is the actual return of the surveillance to the judge. 3 °
Section 2518(8)(a) requires that, after the expiration of a Title III order,
the contents of the surveillance "shall be made available to the judge
issuing such order and sealed under his directions."' 3 1 In United States
v. Donovan, the Supreme Court required that the government supply
additional information to allow the judge to effectively exercise his dis-
cretion under section 2518(8)(d) to provide notice to those not named in
the warrant if it is in the interest of justice.
132
Notice to those not named in the application was made discretion-
127. S. REP. No. 95-701 at 12 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3973, 3980 ("The
need to preserve secrecy for sensitive counterintelligence sources and methods justifies
elimination of the notice requirement ....").
128. S. REP. No. 95-604, pt. 1, at 59-60 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3904,
3960-61.
129. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 60 (1967) ("Nor does the statute provide for a return on
the warrant thereby leaving full discretion in the officer as to the use of seized conversations of
innocent as well as guilty parties.").
130. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(a) (2000).
131. Id.
132. United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 430-32 (1977).
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ary, rather than mandatory, because Congress recognized that in some
cases it would be in the best interest of the target not to notify those
incidentally subject to the surveillance.133 Take for example: "A, a busi-
nessman, talks with his customers, and the latter are served with papers
showing that A is being bugged .... [T]he damage to confidence in A
and to A's reputation in general may damage A unjustly. In this case it
would seem that the customers should not be served with the inven-
tory."' 134 In an analogous situation under FISA, the concern with notify-
ing those incidentally subject to electronic surveillance would not be that
it might be unjust to the agent of a foreign power, but that it would alert
the agent of a foreign power that he was being monitored. In those
situations, discretionary notice would be for the purpose of protecting an
intelligence investigation.
The notice provision in section 2518(8)(d), like the emergency
notice provision in FISA, then mandates inventory notice be served on
those named in the application and provides for discretionary notice to
all others subject to the surveillance for not longer than ninety days after
the duration of the order has expired. 3 5 The notice may be postponed
upon an ex parte showing of good cause by the government.
13 6
There are significant differences in the FISA process. Not only is
there not a general notice provision, but there is no return provision
analogous to section 2518(8)(a) that requires the FBI to return surveil-
lance to the FISC. The FISC is unable to notify anyone that is subject to
surveillance because once the FISA order has been granted, the matter is
generally handled exclusively by the executive. There are two ways that
the FISC can partially discover how a FISA order is being implemented.
First, there is a provision in the statute that allows the FISC to assess the
government's compliance with the minimization procedures. 137 Second,
if the government applies for an extension, this requires the government
to meet the same requirements as if the application was being originally
filed.' 38 In that situation, the application for an extension would likely
contain information regarding previous applications, including past
activities of the target. 139 Both of these situations, however, are a far cry
from a general return provision like section 2518(8)(a) that provides a
judge with direct supervision over the surveillance issued under his
133. Id. at 429-30.
134. Id. at 430.
135. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) (2000).
136. Id. The FISA emergency surveillance provision allows a second showing of good cause
to forego the notice entirely. 50 U.S.C. § 18060) (2000).
137. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(e)(3) (Supp. I 2002).
138. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1805(e)(2) (West 2006).
139. See 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(9) (2000); 50 U.S.C, § 1805(b) (Supp. I 2002).
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authority. Not only does this structural separation between the FISC and
the actual surveillance effectively prevent the FISC from discovering
errors in the process, 40 but it also prevents the FISC from serving any-
one with notice.
This structural separation in the FISA context arises from the mini-
mization procedures and the preference in favor of immediate, non-
supervised destruction, rather than retention, of non-foreign intelligence
information that is gathered. As a general matter, minimization proce-
dures under FISA are procedures adopted by the Attorney General that
meet the flexible statutory definition of procedures that "are reasonably
designed in light of the purpose and technique of the particular surveil-
lance, to minimize the acquisition and retention, and prohibit the dis-
semination, of nonpublicly available information concerning
unconsenting United States persons consistent with the need of the
United States to obtain, produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence
information." 
141
These procedures are borrowed from the concept of minimization
in Title III,142 as they attempt to safeguard the privacy rights of Ameri-
can citizens, as much as practicable, by minimizing the acquisition,
retention, and dissemination of information that is not foreign intelli-
gence information.' 43 Instead of returning such information to the
judge, as is done under Title III, FISA presumes that the best way to
safeguard the privacy of Americans is not to retain any such information
but rather to destroy it:1"
It should be noted that this provision contains one significant change
from the minimization provisions in [Title III]. [Section] 2518 (8) (a)
requires that all interceptions be recorded, if possible, and that the
tapes not be edited or destroyed for ten years. In a criminal context
the maintenance of such tapes and files under court seal ensures that
the interceptions will be retained in their original state so that when
criminal prosecutions are undertaken it is clear that the evidence is
intact and has not been tampered with....
140. It is worth noting that the errors described by the FISC were not discovered by the FISC,
rather, they were confessed by the FBI. In re All Matters, 218 F. Supp. 2d 611, 620-22 (FISA Ct.
2002).
141. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h)(1) (2000).
142. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (2000) ("Every order and extension thereof shall contain a provision
that the authorization to intercept shall be executed as soon as practicable, shall be conducted in
such a way as to minimize the interception of communications not otherwise subject to
interception under this chapter, and must terminate upon attainment of the authorized objective, or
in any event in thirty days.").
143. See supra note 27.
144. S. REP. No. 95-604, pt. 1, at 38 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3904, 3939
("By minimizing retention, the committee intends that information acquired, which does not relate
to the approved purposes justifying the warrant, be destroyed.").
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The Committee believes that in light of the relatively few cases in
which information acquired under this chapter may be used as evi-
dence, the better practice is to allow the destruction of information
that is not foreign intelligence information or evidence of criminal
activity. This course will more effectively safeguard the privacy of
individuals, ensuring that irrelevant information will not be filed....
Destruction insures that the information cannot be used to 'taint' a
civil or criminal proceeding .. .
Instead, immediate destruction ensures that Americans whose conversa-
tions are unlawfully acquired will never find out about the interception
of their communications, preventing civil proceedings from occurring at
all.
If minimization procedures require that acquisition be limited to
situations where foreign intelligence information is likely to be obtained,
and dissemination of such communications is strictly prohibited,' 46 it is
worth asking how the immediate destruction of these communications
materially safeguards privacy. Once the communication is acquired and
sorted, the invasion of privacy has occurred.147 That individual's pri-
vacy may only be further compromised if that recording is disseminated,
which is prohibited unless it "is necessary to understand foreign intelli-
gence information or assess its importance"' 4 8 or if it is "information
that is evidence of a crime which has been, is being, or is about to be
committed."' 4 9 The question is significant because it is this immediate
destruction that effectively prevents the possibility of serving notice and
conducting oversight in cases where something has gone astray in the
process. The heavy costs that destruction imposes in terms of notice and
oversight are not worth sacrificing when the principal invasion of pri-
vacy has already occurred. 5 ° Enabling the vindication, analysis, and
oversight of unlawful surveillance more effectively serves the interests
of privacy than perpetuating the belief that there are no problems
occurring.
145. S. REP. No. 95-604, pt. 1, at 39 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3904, 3940-41.
146. See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h) (2000); infra note 179.
147. Judge Richard Posner has noted that the use of machines to conduct the initial collection
and processing of private data protects the privacy of most private data because it keeps it from
being read by an individual. Richard Posner, Our Domestic Intelligence Crisis, WASH. POST, Dec.
21, 2005, at A31. This distinction is irrelevant in the FISA context, however, because an FBI
agent, and not a machine, is responsible for making the key determination of whether information
that has been gathered under FISA qualifies as foreign intelligence information. See infra notes
154-55 and accompanying text.
148. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h)(2) (2000).
149. Id. § 1801(h)(3).
150. Returning such information to the FISC does not significantly compound the invasion of
privacy. This additional minor invasion is justified by the ultimate objectives of the return
procedure to provide relief for, and improve oversight of, unlawful electronic surveillance.
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The "principal steps in the minimization process"' 5 1 that lead to the
destruction of non-foreign intelligence information are as follows:
[I]nformation is reduced to an intelligible form... once the informa-
tion is understandable, a reviewing official, usually an FBI case
agent, makes an informed judgment as to whether the information
seized is or might be foreign intelligence information related to clan-
destine activities or international terrorism . . . if found not to be
foreign intelligence information, it must be minimized, which can be
done in a variety of ways depending upon the format of the informa-
tion: if recorded the information would not be indexed, and thus
become non-retrievable, if in hard copy from facsimile intercept or
computer print-out it should be discarded, if on re-recordable media it
could be erased, or if too bulky or too sensitive, it might be
destroyed. 152
Information that could be foreign intelligence information is not mini-
mized and "is logged into the FBI's records and filed in a variety of
storage systems from which it can be retrieved for analysis .... In
making this significant determination 54 under the minimization proce-
dures, "minimization is required only if the information 'could not be'
foreign intelligence. Thus, it is obvious that the standard for retention of
FISA-acquired information is weighted heavily in favor of the govern-
ment."155 As such, when sorting the surveillance, there is little risk that
relevant information will be placed in the wrong pile.
The non-foreign intelligence information sorted out by the case
agent should not be immediately destroyed but should instead be
returned to the FISC in a manner similar to the Title III process. The
statute should therefore be amended to require the executive to return
the non-foreign intelligence information to the FISC.156 It should also
require that, before destroying any information, the FISC sort through
the information returned in order to determine if particular individuals
should be provided with notice based on the standard enunciated
below. 15 7 This procedure would therefore accomplish the dual objective
151. In re All Matters, 218 F. Supp. 2d 611, 617 (FISA Ct. 2002).
152. Id. at 617-18.
153. Id. at 618.
154. Id. ("The most critical step in retention is the analysis in which an informed judgment is
made as to whether or not the communications or other data seized is foreign intelligence
information.").
155. Id.
156. It should also be made explicit that returning the non-foreign intelligence information to
the FISC in compliance with the return provision does not violate prohibitions on dissemination.
157. It is consistent with the statute and recent practice to grant the FISC the power to monitor
surveillance conducted under its authority. See 50 U.S.C. § 1805(e)(3) (2000) ("At or before the
end of the period of time for which electronic surveillance is approved by an order or an
extension, the judge may assess compliance with the minimization procedures by reviewing the
[Vol. 61:393
2007] THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT
of achieving greater oversight of the FISA process ' and enabling the
FISC to notify particular individuals who were subjects of unlawful
electronic surveillance.
The statute should then be revised to provide for a notice provision
similar to the one available in the Title III and FISA emergency con-
texts. Unlike the Title III provision, however, not everyone subject to
electronic surveillance can or should be notified.' 59 In fact, not even
everyone subject to unlawful electronic surveillance should be notified.
Indeed, "in the interest of justice" should include only those people who
were subject to prolonged or particularly intrusive unlawful electronic
surveillance.' 6 ° This determination will be in the discretion of the
circumstances under which information concerning United States persons was acquired, retained,
or disseminated."); All Matters, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 620 ("[Tlhe Court was routinely apprised of
consultations and discussions between the FBI, the Criminal Division, and U.S. Attorney's offices
in cases where there were overlapping intelligence and criminal investigations or interests."). It is
also consistent with the legislative history to enable the FISC to act as the ultimate decision-maker
regarding the retention and destruction of information gathered under FISA. See S. REP. No. 95-
604, pt. 1, at 38 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3904, 3939 ("Procedures governing
minimization - particularly how long information should be retained and how it should be
destroyed once it is deemed irrelevant - are to be fashioned by the court and are, of course, subject
to judicial supervision.").
158. As important as the congressional reporting requirements are, they do not allow for the
daily oversight that the FISC can provide in terms of spotting grievous errors in the process.
Statistical information regarding the number of FISA applications submitted, granted, modified,
and denied is unlikely to be of much use to Congress in fulfilling its oversight responsibilities.
See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text. Furthermore, the Senate Judiciary Committee has
recently remarked:
Particularly with respect to our FISA oversight efforts, we are disappointed with the
non-responsiveness of the DOJ and FBI. Although the FBI and the DOJ have
sometimes cooperated with our oversight efforts, often, legitimate requests went
unanswered or the DOJ answers were delayed for so long or were so incomplete that
they were of minimal use in the oversight efforts of this Committee.
FISA Implementation Failures Before S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2003), available
at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2003_rpt/fisa.html.
159. No mandatory notice for those named in the application should be required. If notice was
required for all those named in a FISA order, then this, like the emergency notice provision, could
have the effect of notifying many agents of a foreign power. See supra notes 123-25 and
accompanying text.
160. When considering the degree of intrusiveness, the FISC should be guided by Fourth
Amendment principles. For example, communications taking place in the home should be
considered substantially more private than those made in public. Compare Kyllo v. United States,
533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001) ("The Fourth Amendment's protection of the home has never been tied to
measurement of the quality or quantity of information obtained .... In the home, our cases show,
all details are intimate details, because the entire area is held safe from prying government eyes."),
and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967) (finding a reasonable expectation of privacy
in communications made from inside a public telephone booth), with United States v. Dionisio,
410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973) (holding that an individual does not enjoy a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the physical characteristics of his own voice because it is constantly exposed to the
public).
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FISC.
16 1
When extracting non-foreign intelligence information, the FBI case
agent familiar with the case should label communications made by the
agent of a foreign power and those related to him. This will assist the
FISC with its notice determination and oversight responsibilities. In
addition, the government should be required, if necessary, and as it was
in Donovan, to assist the FISC with any questions regarding the
surveillance. 
62
When the FISC decides that a particular individual should be noti-
fied, the government will have the same opportunity, on an ex parte
showing of good cause, to have the notice postponed or dispensed with
altogether. Those connected to an agent of a foreign power, such as the
oblivious spouse or next door neighbor, should be initially filtered out
by the FBI case agent, thus preventing the FISC from identifying them
as potential notice recipients; the government, however, would act as an
additional safety net in this regard.
The government as a matter of policy would likely contest every
decision to notify, but good cause here should require a specific showing
that the notice would inform one of these individuals that they were
being monitored or that notice would have the effect of disclosing confi-
dential intelligence methods. Generalized assertions that "information
that is embarrassing to [the federal government] must be kept secret for
reasons of national security" '16 3 should not suffice. The showing to the
FISC must specifically demonstrate how serving notice to that particular
individual will compromise national security.
Notifying individuals of the mere fact that they have been subject
to surveillance under FISA, even if they are clearly not agents of a for-
eign power or connected to an agent of a foreign power, is, understanda-
bly, likely to be the most controversial proposal in this Note. The
distinction must be made, however, between disclosure that concretely
threatens national security and disclosure that would merely embarrass
the government. Based on its experience, competence, and the separa-
tion of powers, the FISC is the ideal body to make the determination as
to whether notice really would provide terrorists with a page in our
161. Separation of powers compels vesting this check on executive power with the FISC
instead of with the executive branch itself. Cf 50 U.S.C. § 1825(b) (2000) (granting the Attorney
General unchecked discretion to serve notice to those subject to physical searches under FISA).
162. See supra note 132 and accompanying text; see also 50 U.S.C. § 1804(d) (2000) ("The
judge may require the applicant to furnish such other information as may be necessary to make the
determinations required by section 1805 of this title.").
163. Letter from Anthony D. Romero, Director, American Civil Liberties Union, to Dianne
Feinstein, United States Senator (Apr. 4, 2005), http://www.aclu.org//safefree/general/
175631eg20050404.html.
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playbook or whether it would merely confirm the widespread and
uncontroversial knowledge of the existence of the playbook itself.1"
The safeguards in this procedure, as well as the limited information actu-
ally disclosed, as described in Part V.B, ensure that when notice is pro-
vided, it will not endanger national security.
To briefly sum up, the main safeguards in this proposed return and
notice scheme are as follows. First, the FBI case agent, before filtering
out non-foreign intelligence information, must be sure that such infor-
mation could not be foreign intelligence information. This even prohib-
its the agent from including unlawfully obtained information in the non-
foreign intelligence pile. Second, the FISC will only isolate those com-
munications representing a prolonged and intrusive invasion of privacy.
Third, the government here would be able to specifically explain how
and why serving notice in a particular case would threaten national
security.
Only after the FISC has made its notice determinations should the
non-foreign intelligence information pertaining to all those not notified
be destroyed. Non-foreign intelligence information forming the basis of
notice should not be destroyed until a time after damages are
assessed. 165
When notice is provided to an individual, it will then be left to the
individual to decide whether to take further action. It may very well be
that those who are notified would not take action; many may even con-
164. The government has refused to draw such a distinction. The following is a revealing
exchange between Senator Joseph Biden and Attorney General Alberto Gonzales at the Senate
Judiciary Committee's hearings regarding the NSA program:
BIDEN: General, how has this revelation [of the NSA program] damaged the
program? I'm almost confused by it but, I mean, it seems to presuppose that these
very sophisticated Al Qaida folks didn't think we were intercepting their phone
calls. I mean, I'm a little confused. How did it damage this?
GONZALES: . . . I think, based on my experience, it is true - you would assume
that the enemy is presuming that we are engaged in some kind of surveillance. But
if they're not reminded about it all the time in the newspapers and in stores, they
sometimes forget.
(LAUGHTER).
Wartime Executive Power and the National Security Agency's Surveillance Authority Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 2, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2006/02/06/AR2006020601359.html (statements of Sen. Joseph Biden, Member,
Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, and Alberto Gonzales, Attorney General). Instead of a blanket and
illogical prohibition on disclosure, an independent judicial body like the FISC would possess both
the competence and experience to make such distinctions. Indeed, three federal district courts
have recently denied the government's invocation of the states secret doctrine in an attempt to
prevent lawsuits challenging the NSA program from going forward. See A1-Haramain Islamic
Found., Inc. v. Bush, No. 06-274-KI, 2006 WL 2583425, at *9-*24 (D. Or. Sept. 7, 2006); ACLU
v. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754, 758-66 (E.D. Mich. 2006); Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp.
2d 974, 980-99 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
165. See supra note 145 and quoted text; infra note 187.
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sider it a noble sacrifice in the name of helping the country fight the war
on terror. "Although litigants may not often choose to seek relief, it is
important, in a civilized society, that the judicial branch of the Nation's
government stand ready to afford a remedy in these circumstances.' 66
The next issue then must be determining the proper remedy for those
individuals that are served with notice and do decide to seek relief.
VI. REMEDY
A. Enlarging the Scope of Civil Liability
The errors in Part III indicate that many individuals have been sub-
ject to unlawful electronic surveillance and have never found out. The
FISC will serve some of these individuals with notice under the return
and notice procedure set forth in Part IV. In order for the notice to mean
anything, however, these individuals must be able to seek actual relief.
Section 1810 as currently written is not capable of affording such
relief. That provision reads as follows:
An aggrieved person, other than a foreign power or an agent of a
foreign power, as defined in section 1801(a) or (b)(1)(A) of this title,
respectively, who has been subjected, to an electronic surveillance or
about who information obtained by electronic surveillance of such
person has been disclosed or used in violation of section 1809 of this
title shall have a cause of action against any person who committed
such violation ....
Aggrieved person is defined as "a person who is the target of an elec-
tronic surveillance or any other person whose communications or activi-
ties were subject to electronic surveillance."' 68  Not all aggrieved
persons have a cause of action, however, because section 1810 requires
that the electronic surveillance be in violation of section 1809, the provi-
sion governing criminal liability. 169 Any ambiguity in the language of
166. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 411
(1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
167. 50 U.S.C. § 1810 (2000). If an individual is found liable under section 1810, the plaintiff
is "entitled to recover (a) actual damages, but not less than liquidated damages of $1,000 or $100
per day for each day of violation, whichever is greater; (b) punitive damages; and (c) reasonable
attorney's fees and other investigation and litigation costs reasonably incurred." Id.
168. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(k) (2000).
169. Section 1809 has been subject to increased attention since the revelation of the NSA
program because, by its very terms, it has the potential to subject administration officials to
criminal liability for conducting electronic surveillance outside of FISA. An earlier version of
Senator Specter's bill sought to retroactively immunize the conduct of government officials. See
Posting of Glenn Greenwald to Unclaimed Territory, http://glenngreenwald.blogspot.com/2006/
09/arlen-specter-is-lying-about-his-own.html (Sept. 16, 2006 10:27 EST) ("But once a copy of
Specter's became available that week, it turned out that Specter's bill did contain the very blanket
amnesty provision which he falsely denied on national television he was offering. As I wrote at the
time, the Post and the ACLU were completely correct and Specter - in order to make his bill seem
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section 1810 over this point is clarified by the brief legislative history on
these two provisions that states: "The conferees agree that the civil lia-
bility of intelligence agents under this Act should coincide with the
criminal liability." 7 °
Section 1809(a) criminalizes intentional electronic surveillance that
is unauthorized by the statute,17' but section 1809(b) makes it a com-
plete defense if the "electronic surveillance was authorized by and con-
ducted pursuant to a search warrant or court order of a court of
competent jurisdiction."'' 72 Consequently, it is only a violation of sec-
tion 1809 for purposes of section 1810 when the surveillance is both
intentional and not authorized by or conducted pursuant to a FISA order.
The Brandon Mayfield case illustrates how section 1809 and sec-
tion 1810 apply to victims of errors in the application process. The pri-
mary fact contributing to the finding of probable cause to believe that
Mayfield was an agent of a foreign power was the result of the errone-
ous fingerprint analysis. 173 Mayfield would have had no cause of action
under section 1810 because the surveillance, though based on an errone-
ous factual premise, was authorized by and conducted pursuant to an
order issued by the FISC. The same result would have followed even if
Mayfield's allegations that the FBI had filed false affidavits were
true. 174 This is due to the fact that nothing in section 1809 requires that
the FISA order be valid. While this may be appropriate for criminal
liability, it has created a situation where those subject to surveillance
based on an invalid FISA order would not have a cause of action under
section 1810 even though conducting the surveillance violates the
statute.
For victims of implementation errors, the surveillance would not be
less draconian than it really was - simply lied about what his own bill said (that express amnesty
provision was thereafter removed from the bill, though the effect of the current Specter bill might
be the same)."). With the current bill's removal of the "exclusive means" language, Specter
would also amend section 1809 so that there would be criminal liability only if the surveillance
violated the Constitution (rather than merely the statute). See National Security Surveillance Act
of 2006, supra note 13, § 801(c)(2).
170. H.R. REP. No. 95-1720, at 34 (1978) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4048, 4063.
171. 50 U.S.C. § 1809(a) (2000) (emphasis added).
172. Id. § 1809(b) (emphasis added).
173. See A REVIEW OF THE FBI's HANDLING OF THE BRANDON MAYFIELD CASE, supra note 21,
at 18.
174. See Joel Gallob, Local Attorney on Team Filing Suit Against Feds for Lawyer Brandon
Mayfield, NEWPORT NEWs-TIMES, Oct. 13, 2004, available at http://www.newportnewstimes.com/
articles/2004/10/13/news/news24.txt ("He asserts the FBI then filed 'false and misleading
affidavits with courts in Portland, Oregon and Washington, D.C., in order to justify
eavesdropping, telephone wiretaps .... '); A REVIEW OF THE FBI's HANDLING OF THE BRANDON
MAYFIELD CASE, supra note 21, at 20 (finding no intentional violations by the FBI).
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"authorized by" the FISA order, thus removing the surveillance from the
scope of the defense of section 1809(b). The obstacle for these individu-
als, rather, is the initial requirement of section 1809(a) that the surveil-
lance be intentional. Implementation errors would not meet this
requirement because, although the surveillance would be intentionally
conducted, it would not be intentionally directed against that particular
individual.
The solution requires that the scope of civil liability should not
depend on section 1809. Instead, it should first require that the FISA
order relied upon be valid under the statute. This would allow section
1810 to provide relief to victims of unlawful electronic surveillance
where the underlying FISA order was invalid, whether due to factual
inaccuracies, fingerprint or other forensic errors, false affidavits, failure
to follow minimization procedures, or improper certification.175 Addi-
tionally, in order to encompass victims of implementation errors, section
1810 should not require that the violation be intentional. While appro-
priate for criminal liability, the fact that an individual was unintention-
ally subject to unlawful electronic surveillance should be sufficient for
purposes of civil liability. Therefore, in order to encompass both errors
in the application and implementation processes, civil liability should
extend to any aggrieved person subject to unlawful electronic surveil-
lance. It is significant, however, that the only aggrieved persons actually
capable of availing themselves of section 1810 will be those served with
notice under Part IV.
Although the civil liability provisions in Title III preclude liability
when there is "good faith reliance on a court warrant or order," '176 FISA
is distinguishable because it lacks a general notice provision. If the
return and notice provision of Part IV is adopted, those served with
notice must be able to seek relief for the unlawful surveillance, regard-
less of whether it was, like the errors in Part III, unintentional or author-
ized by and conducted pursuant to an invalid FISA order.
Respecting Congress' original intent to make criminal and civil lia-
bility co-extensive,1 77 changes must be made when major statutory vio-
lations have become incapable of being redressed. Indeed, when
enacting the Patriot Act, Congress recognized the need to enlarge the
scope of civil liability for the unlawful disclosure of information gath-
ered under both Title III and FISA that previously had not been cov-
175. See supra note 125.
176. 18 U.S.C. § 2520(d) (2000); id. § 2707(e)(1).
177. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 61:393
THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT
ered. 78 This enlargement destroyed the co-extensive scope of criminal
and civil liability 7  in order to remedy the "inequitable situation" that
emerged.' 80
Congress, however, did not recognize the inequitable situation of
the victims of unlawful surveillance and therefore failed to similarly
enlarge the scope of section 1810.81 The current scope of section 1810
is far too narrow to provide relief for victims of the errors described in
Part III and served with notice under the procedure of Part IV. If the
notice procedure of Part IV is to be meaningful, it must be accompanied
by civil liability capable of remedying the violations identified by the
FISC.
The effect of this proposed enlargement would be that, in the pro-
cess of identifying those individuals entitled to receive notice, the FISC
would be making a determination that the individual is entitled to relief.
The issue of liability would therefore be determined by the FISC as it
decides who is eligible to receive notice. This would significantly elimi-
nate the need for any subsequent judicial determination of liability.
Concerns that these revisions unnecessarily broaden the scope of civil
liability are again ameliorated by the fact that if the return and notice
scheme of Part IV is adopted, only a select few within this scope would
actually be served with the notice necessary to seek relief.
B. Claims Procedure and Compliance with Due Process
Because liability would be determined contemporaneously with the
FISC's decision to notify an individual, it would be inappropriate to
178. See DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, USA PATRIOT ACT: SUNSET REPORT 67 (2005), available at
http://www.epic.org/privacy/terrorism/usapatriot/Sunsets-ReportFinal.pdf.
179. Section 223 of the Patriot Act added a new cause of action for any willful violation of 50
U.S.C. § 1806(a) that prohibits disclosure of information obtained both lawfully and unlawfully
under FISA. United and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, § 223(c)(1)(a), 115 Stat. 272,
292 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §2712(a) (Supp. I 2002)). Section 1809, however, criminalizes
disclosure of information obtained only by "electronic surveillance not authorized by statute." 50
U.S.C. § 1809(a)(2) (2000).
180. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, USA PATRIOT ACT: SUNSET REPORT, supra note 178 ("Thus,
while those engaging in illegal wiretapping or electronic surveillance were subject to civil
liability, those illegally disclosing communications lawfully intercepted pursuant to a court order
generally could not be sued. Section 223 of the USA Patriot Act remedied this inequitable
situation."). It would really amount only to an inequitable situation in the FISA context if liability
was possible in the former case which, as this Note demonstrates, is currently not a reality.
18 1. It should be noted that the House of Representatives sought to revise section 18 10 in a bill
that was considered three weeks prior to the enactment of the Patriot Act. The bill substituted as
the defendant the individual or entity responsible and adopted the same statute of limitations,
administrative discipline, and administrative settlement provisions found in Title III. See Provide
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (PATRIOT) Act of 2001, H.R.
2975, 107th Cong. § 161.
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require that individual to bring a traditional cause of action. Section
1810 should be amended to eliminate the cause of action and to establish
in its place a claims procedure by which notified individuals could file a
claim in the FISC for damages. Authorizing the FISC to process these
claims would prevent federal courts from being required to conduct in
camera analyses of complex FISA investigations with which they are
unfamiliar.
There would be no practical reason for claimants to bring suit
because the FISC, an Article III court, would be responsible for deter-
mining liability and assessing damages. Nonetheless, if for some ideo-
logical or tactical reason an individual filed suit in open court, he would
not be able to bring a Bivens action182 or a claim under the Federal Torts
Claims Act (FTCA)'83 because the individual would not have the factual
information necessary to state a claim. Similar to Title III and FISA
emergency surveillance cases, the notice would merely inform the indi-
vidual of the fact that information was unlawfully obtained using elec-
tronic surveillance pursuant to FISA. 184
Nonetheless, Congress should expressly declare the claims proce-
dure to be the exclusive remedy, thus displacing all other judicial (Biv-
ens claims) and statutory (FTCA) remedies.185 So even if the individual
182. Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)
(creating a judicial cause of action brought under the Fourth Amendment for damages against
federal officials).
183. Federal Torts Claims Act, Pub. L. No. 79-601, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
184. Even if the notice itself could be included as evidence of unlawful electronic surveillance,
this would not be sufficient to state a claim under Bivens or the FTCA. Bivens actions require that
the plaintiff allege a constitutional harm. Although serious statutory violations of FISA would
likely amount to a violation of the Fourth Amendment, this would not necessarily be true for all
such violations. A Bivens plaintiff would also need access to the particular facts of his case in
order to identify the individual responsible for the violation. See Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v.
Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 (1994) (holding that Bivens actions may only be brought against the
individual officer).
Similar factual obstacles would face a FTCA plaintiff who is required to allege narrow and
particular tortious conduct. See 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2000) ("The United States shall be liable,
respecting the provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same
extent as a private individual under like circumstances ...."); 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (Supp. I 2002)
(exempting broad categories of tortious conduct from liability).
185. It is significant that the claims procedure actually eliminates litigation obstacles for both
Bivens and FICA plaintiffs. See supra note 184. With respect to Bivens plaintiffs, it would
remove the difficult requirement that the victim identify the individual directly responsible for the
violation. In many cases, the FISA system itself will be responsible for the violation rather than
any particular individual. Even if the victim could successfully identify an individual defendant,
qualified immunity, and perhaps even absolute immunity, would pose a major obstacle to relief in
light of the nature of the violations. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 812 (1982) ("For
aides entrusted with discretionary authority in such sensitive areas as national security or foreign
policy, absolute immunity might well be justified to protect the unhesitating performance of
functions vital to the national interest.").
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possesses sufficient factual information to state a claim, the action
would be precluded by the elaborate and exclusive claims procedure.
18 6
The notice itself, aside from informing the individual that he has
been subject to electronic surveillance under FISA, would also inform
the individual that he is entitled to compensation if he chooses to file a
claim. The claimant should be provided with: (1) the administrative fil-
ing details; (2) the statute of limitations; 187 (3) the fact that the remedy is
With respect to FTCA claims, the claimant would not need to satisfy stringent procedural
requirements, see 28 U.S.C. § 2675 (2000), or show that the governmental conduct met particular
substantive requirements, see supra note 184.
186. Most recently, the Supreme Court has expressed a staunch unwillingness to imply Bivens
actions absent a showing that the plaintiff has no other remedy available. See Corr. Serv. Corp. v.
Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 74 (2001) ("In sum, respondent is not a plaintiff in search of a remedy as in
Bivens and Davis [v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979)]."). Because the plaintiff here would clearly
have an alternate remedy, his action would be precluded under this standard. Prior to Malesko, the
Court found Bivens actions precluded where Congress provided for elaborate remedial
mechanisms found to be constitutionally adequate, even though they were not as desirable or
complete as the Bivens remedy and even though Congress did not specify that the remedy
provided would be exclusive. See Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988) (holding that the
elaborate remedial system provided by the Social Security Act provided meaningful remedies and
safeguards for those in the plaintiff's position and therefore precluded a Bivens action); Bush v.
Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983) (holding that the Civil Service Commission's Appeals Review Board
was an elaborate remedial system providing plaintiffs with an adequate remedy sufficient to
preclude a Bivens action). Because the claims procedure here would be expressly exclusive and
would provide an adequate remedy for those claiming violations of the Fourth Amendment, a
Bivens action would be precluded. Such an action would be precluded for the same reasons even
under the generous standard articulated in Bivens. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397 ("For we have here no
explicit congressional declaration that persons injured by a federal officer's violation of the Fourth
Amendment may not recover money damages from the agents, but must instead be remitted to
another remedy, equally effective in the view of Congress."); see also Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S.
14, 18-19 (1980) (finding a Bivens action precluded when Congress provided an alternative
remedy which it explicitly declared to be a substitute for recovery directly under the Constitution).
With respect to the FTCA, Congress may preempt its availability by expressly declaring the
claims procedure to be the exclusive remedy against the United States. See Johansen v. United
States, 343 U.S. 427, 441 (1966) ("As the government has created a comprehensive system to
award payments for injuries, it should not be held to have made exceptions to that system without
specific legislation to that effect."); see, e.g., Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 460 U.S.
190, 193-94 (1983) ("FECA's exclusive liability provision .. .was designed to protect the
Government from suits under statutes, such as the Federal Tort Claims Act, that had been enacted
to waive the Government's sovereign immunity .... This compromise is essentially the same as
that found, for example, in the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act
(LHWCA)."); United States v. Demko, 385 U.S. 149, 152 (1966) (finding FTCA claims brought
by injured federal prisoners preempted by an exclusive compensation statute); Pueschel v. Mineta,
369 F.3d 345, 348 (4th Cir. 2004) ("With regard to Pueschel's FTCA suit, we hold that it was
properly dismissed on preemption grounds given that Title VII establishes the exclusive and
preemptive scheme under which federal employees can seek redress for employment
discrimination.").
187. If the majority of notified individuals file claims, it will be preferable for the FISC to
compute damages when they make their liability determination. This would allow the FISC to
destroy the non-foreign intelligence information at that point instead of waiting for the statute of
limitations to lapse. Even if the FISC determines that it would be preferable to wait for a claim to
be filed before assessing damages, the statute of limitations should be relatively short in order to
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exclusive; (4) that the contents of the surveillance will not be disclosed;
and (5) that there will be no opportunity to appear before the FISC or
appeal the amount of damages awarded.
This claims procedure would, however, be subject to the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The first issue in the procedural
due process analysis is whether unlawful electronic surveillance consti-
tutes a deprivation of liberty within the meaning of the Due Process
Clause. 1
88
Because many of the errors described in Part HI will be uninten-
tional, these violations may not qualify as deprivations of liberty based
on the Supreme Court's opinion in Daniels v. Williams.'89 The Court in
Daniels held that lack of due care by state officials does not constitute a
"deprivation" within the meaning of the Due Process Clause.' 90 The
Court stated, "[far from an abuse of power, lack of due care suggests no
more than a failure to measure up to the conduct of a reasonable person.
To hold that injury caused by such conduct is a deprivation within the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment would trivialize the centuries-
old principle of due process of law."' 9 ' This distinction between negli-
gent and intentional governmental misconduct would be unworkable
under the claims procedure because the scope of section 1810 above
would eliminate that distinction for purposes of notice and liability. 92
To further complicate this threshold issue, a plurality of the
Supreme Court in Albright v. Oliver held that an arrest and prosecution
without probable cause did not state a substantive due process claim
because the Fourth Amendment, and not the Fourteenth Amendment,
protected individuals from that particular governmental conduct. 93 A
minimize the retention of the non-foreign intelligence information. Further justifying a short
filing period would be the fact that filing the claim would require minimal preparation on the
claimant's behalf because liability has already been determined.
188. This analysis assumes that the right to be free from electronic surveillance implicates a
constitutionally protected liberty interest. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("[The Framers] conferred, as against the government, the right to
be let alone - the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.").
189. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
190. Id. at 330-31.
191. Id. at 332.
192. The Court in Daniels, however, did note:
[T]hat injuries inflicted by governmental negligence are not addressed by the United
States Constitution is not to say that they may not raise significant legal concerns
and lead to the creation of protectible legal interests. The enactment of tort claim
statutes, for example, reflects the view that injuries caused by such negligence
should generally be redressed.
Id. at 333.
193. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994) (plurality opinion) ("Where a particular
Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against a particular
sort of government behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of substantive due
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broad reading of Albright may support the proposition that unlawful
electronic surveillance is not a deprivation of liberty within the meaning
of the Due Process Clause because such surveillance is a search under
the Fourth Amendment, 94 and therefore, that Amendment must afford
all the process that is due. However, "the Fourth Amendment probable
cause determination is in fact only the first state of an elaborate system,
unique in jurisprudence, designed to safeguard the rights of those
accused of criminal conduct."19 5  Because the individual subject to
unlawful electronic surveillance under FISA is not brought into the
criminal justice system, that individual must look to the claims proce-
dure to vindicate his rights instead of traditional Fourth Amendment
safeguards. Therefore, despite the fact. that electronic surveillance is
governmental conduct protected by the Fourth Amendment, it may
nonetheless constitute a deprivation of liberty within the meaning of the
Due Process Clause because traditional Fourth Amendment protections
would not be available in this context. Due to the complexities arising
from Daniels, Albright, and the unusual nature of the claims procedure,
the remainder of this section assumes that the claims procedure must
satisfy due process.
The next issue then is whether there is a violation of due process by
affording process after the deprivation has occurred. 196 In Parratt v.
Taylor, an inmate at a state prison filed suit in federal court under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 alleging a deprivation of property without due process
when the prison misplaced and lost hobby materials that the inmate
process, must be the guide for analyzing these claims.") (internal quotations and citations
omitted)). This rationale would similarly preclude a substantive due process challenge to the
FISA process. Even if such a claim went forward, the compelling governmental interests in
gathering foreign intelligence information would likely prevail, even under heightened scrutiny.
See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981) ("It is obvious and unarguable that no governmental
interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation.... Measures to protect the secrecy of
our Government's foreign intelligence operations plainly serve these interests.") (internal
quotations and citations omitted)).
194. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
195. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 698 (1977) (White, J., dissenting); see also Gerstein v.
Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975) ("Accordingly, we hold that the Fourth Amendment requires a
judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty following
arrest.").
196. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 407 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) ("The root
requirement of the Due Process Clause [is] that an individual be given an opportunity for a
hearing before he is deprived of any significant property interest.") (internal quotations omitted));
Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 701 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("To be sure, the timing of the process may be
a critical element in determining its adequacy that is, in deciding what process is due in a
particular context. Generally, adequate notice and a fair opportunity to be heard in advance of any
deprivation of a constitutionally protected interest are essential. The Court has recognized,
however, that the wording of the command that there shall be no deprivation 'without' due
process of law is consistent with the conclusion that a postdeprivation remedy is sometimes
constitutionally sufficient.").
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ordered through the mail.' 97 The Court held that the post-deprivation
remedy provided by state tort law was adequate and therefore satisfied
due process. 98 The Court reasoned that such post-deprivation process
was permissible where the alleged deprivation was the result of a "ran-
dom and unauthorized act by a state employee."' 99 In those cases, "it is
not only impracticable, but impossible, to provide a meaningful hearing
before the deprivation" because the "[s]tate cannot predict precisely
when the loss will occur."2" Three years later, the Court extended the
rationale of Parratt in Hudson v. Palmer to intentional deprivations by
state employees when the state could still not predict when such depriva-
tions would occur.20 ' And a few years later, the Parratt-Hudson doc-
trine was extended to deprivations of liberty as well as property.
20 2
Whether the rationale underlying Parratt and Hudson permits a
post-deprivation remedy in the present context depends on the feasibility
of pre-deprivation process.20 3 Although the errors in Part III may be
generally foreseeable, it would be impossible for the government to pro-
vide the individual with any notice or process capable of preventing the
violation. The errors contributing to the deprivation here are both ran-
dom and unauthorized as these terms are used in Parratt and Hudson;
197. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
198. Id. at 543-44.
199. Id. at 541.
200. Id.
201. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984) ("The state can no more anticipate and
control in advance the random and unauthorized intentional conduct of its employees that it can
anticipate similar negligent conduct."). Daniels overruled Parratt on the issue of whether
negligent governmental conduct may constitute a deprivation of liberty. See supra notes 185-187
and accompanying text.
202. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 132 (1990) ("But the reasoning of Parratt and Hudson
emphasizes the State's inability to provide predeprivation process because of the random and
unpredictable nature of the deprivation, not the fact that only property losses were at stake."). It is
worth noting that prior to Parratt, Hudson, and Zinermon, the Court held in Ingraham that state
common law remedies available to students after they were subject to paddling, a constitutional
deprivation of liberty, were sufficient to satisfy due process. Ingraham v. Wright, 403 U.S. 651,
682 (1977).
203. Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 132 ("[T]he reasoning of Parratt and Hudson emphasizes the
state's inability to provide predeprivation process .. "). Limiting the application of Parratt to
state deprivations is not central to its rationale. See Rodney A. Smolla, The Displacement of
Federal Due Process Claims by State Tort Remedies: Parratt v. Taylor and Logan v. Zimmerman
Bmsh Company, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 831, 881-83 (1982) ("Parratt was decided with reference to
actions against state officers and agencies, but it should apply with equal force to deprivations of
property or liberty by federal officials, whenever federal law establishes judicial or administrative
remedies that are adequate to compensate the victim. . . . At both the federal and state level,
Parratt could be legitimately invoked to bar a section 1983 or Bivens claim in cases in which
administrative or judicial remedies other than compensatory tort mechanisms provide an
individual with adequate relief."); see also Weiss v. Lehman, 676 F.2d 1320 (9th Cir. 1982)
(holding that the Federal Torts Claims Act was an adequate remedy under Parratt for actions
taken by a federal official).
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even though the government may be aware that such incidents may
occur, it is not capable of determining the precise instances where, for
example, technology will fail or clerical errors will lead to surveillance
of the wrong phone number. Because it is simply not possible to predict
these specific incidents and provide pre-deprivation process, a post-dep-
rivation remedy would not violate due process.
When post-deprivation process is permissible under Parratt, the
remedy must be adequate in order to satisfy due process. The balancing
test of Mathews v. Eldridge generally determines whether the process
afforded by the state is sufficient, 2" but:
Parratt and Hudson represent a special case of the general Mathews
v. Eldridge analysis, in which postdeprivation... remedies are all the
process that is due, simply because they are the only remedies the
state could be expected to provide.... Thus, Parratt is not an excep-
tion to the Mathews balancing test, but rather an application of that
test to the unusual case in which one of the variables in the Mathews
equation - the value of predeprivation safeguards - is negligible in
preventing the kind of deprivation at issue. Therefore, no matter how
significant the private interest at stake and the risk of erroneous dep-
rivation, the State cannot be required constitutionally to do the
impossible by providing predeprivation process.2 °5
Therefore, instead of analyzing the claims procedure under Mathews, all
that Parratt requires is that the claims procedure provide for an adequate
post-deprivation remedy.2 °6
The Court in Parratt found the state law remedies adequate because
they "could have fully compensated the respondent for the property loss
he suffered. '' 20 7 Despite the fact that the "state remedies may not pro-
vide the respondent with all the relief which may have been available if
he could have proceeded under § 1983, that does not mean that the state
remedies are not adequate to satisfy the requirements of due process.20 8
204. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) ("[Dlue process generally requires
consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used,
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.").
205. Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 128-29 (internal citations omitted).
206. Parratt does not require or even suggest that the adequate post-deprivation remedy must
come in the form of tort law. See Smolla, supra note 203, at 883 ("Although Parratt dealt with
tort remedies as the alternative and adequate process due to an individual deprived of liberty or
property, Parratt's rationale is sufficiently expansive to encompass within the concept of
adequacy a range of remedial systems substantially broader than the law of torts.").
207. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 544 (1981).
208. Id.; Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 535 (1984) ("[T]hat Palmer might not be able to
recover under these remedies the full amount which he might receive in a § 1983 action is not ...
determinative of the adequacy of the state remedies."). It has been suggested that Parratt
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In this case, the claims procedure would fully compensate the claimant
for statutory violations that previously had been completely unrecover-
able. Furthermore, it would actually make such recovery easier than if
the claimant had been forced to use traditional remedial avenues.
20 9
First, the FISC would have conveniently determined liability in the
claimant's favor before he even files the claim. Second, contrary to
many post-deprivation remedies that impose additional obstacles, most
notably immunity for governmental officials,210 the claims procedure
removes such obstacles for the claimant. This would be an exceptionally
easy case for determining the adequacy of the remedy because the gov-
ernment is not attempting to statutorily limit its liability. Instead, it is
striving to create a new and automatic avenue of relief where no remedy
was previously available. Because the claims procedure would fully
compensate victims of statutory violations who previously had no ave-
nue for relief and would remove litigation obstacles for those individu-
als, this claims procedure must be considered adequate under Parratt's
deferential standard of review.2 1
Even considering the Mathews factors, the inability of the claimant
to appear before the FISC or appeal the damages awarded would not
compel a contrary result. While the opportunity to be heard is generally
a critical aspect of due process, above all else "[d]ue process is flexible
and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation
demands. '2 2 Hearings are most appropriate when an individual's fac-
tual showing can prevent the anticipated deprivation.21 3 In this situation,
however, there is no reason to have the claimant appear before the FISC
because the deprivation is complete and the FISC, in determining liabil-
ity and assessing damages, is acting on the claimant's behalf. The noti-
fied individual would have nothing to challenge but the amount of
damages awarded by the FISC. The governmental interests in maintain-
ing the secrecy of the FISA process and protecting methods of gathering
intelligence would outweigh the risk of erroneous deprivation with
announced a highly deferential standard of review with respect to the adequacy of post-
deprivation remedies. See Smolla, supra note 203, at 878 ("Parratt will thus permit states
considerable license to develop their own tort rules, including highly restrictive statutes of
limitations and doctrines of immunity, but a modicum of investigation into the 'adequacy' of those
tort rules will remain.").
209. See supra notes 184-85.
210. See Smolla, supra note 203, at 871 ("One of the most difficult problems to be addressed
after Parratt involves the role of immunities in the adequacy determination.").
211. See supra note 208.
212. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471, 481 (1972)).
213. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (holding that a pre-termination hearing
is required for welfare recipients).
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respect to the amount of damages awarded by the FISC, the same inde-
pendent judicial body that would already have determined the issue of
liability in the claimant's favor.21 4
The absence of an opportunity to appeal the damages awarded is
further justified by the separation of powers. This is the same logic that
requires the FISC, an Article III court, to determine whether the execu-
tive branch should be liable for its actions. "The 'adequacy' concept,
particularly when applied to ... compensation systems, should be rela-
tively deferential, but elemental notions such as conflict of interest, sep-
aration of powers, and accountability must remain as minimums below
which states may not go."21 5 Although it is possible that the FISC could
determine liability in a claimant's favor only to subsequently award
damages incommensurate with the violation, separation of powers dic-
tates that this risk does not outweigh the same governmental interests
that preclude the claimant from filing his claim in federal court and
appearing before the FISC.
In sum, even if there was a deprivation of a constitutionally pro-
tected interest, the claims procedure satisfies due process. The unpre-
dictability of the violations would permit the post-deprivation remedy,
and the remedy would fully compensate claimants for the violations,
thus satisfying the adequacy standard under Parratt. This conclusion is
further supported by the flexibility of due process, which would recog-
nize the unique context of the claims procedure, respect the sensitive
governmental interests at stake, and uphold the voluntary efforts by the
government to remedy statutory violations affecting personal privacy. It
would indeed be ironic if the requirements of due process invalidated the
government's first affirmative effort to effectuate civil liability under
FISA.
VII. CONCLUSION
A. Specific Proposals of this Note
The proposed measures in this Note are admittedly imperfect and
peculiar. These attributes, however, merely reflect the FISA process
itself. When asked at his Senate confirmation hearing about the poten-
tial responsibility of appointing members to the FISC, then-Judge Rob-
erts remarked, "I'll be very candid. When I first learned about the FISA
court, I was surprised. It's not what we usually think of when we think
214. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 ("In the words of Mathews, process of this
sort would sufficiently address the 'risk of erroneous deprivation' of a[n] [individual's] liberty
interest while eliminating certain procedures that have questionable additional value in light of the
burden on the Government.").
215. Smolla, supra note 203, at 885-86.
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of a court. . . . This is a very different and unusual institution."' 2 6 It
should therefore be no surprise that the deficiencies of the unique and
secretive FISA process require a compensatory scheme with similar
attributes.
Continuing his testimony with respect to the FISC, Roberts went
on:
But it does seem to me that the departures from the normal judicial
model that are involved there put a premium on the individuals
involved. I think the people who are selected for that tribunal have to
be above reproach. There can't be any question that these are among
the best judges that our system has, the fairest judges, the ones who
are most sensitive to the different issues involved, because they don't
have the oversight of the public being able to see what's going on.217
During one of the Senate Judiciary Committee's NSA hearings, both
Senator Specter and Attorney General Gonzales appeared to agree that
the judges possessed these characteristics:
SPECTER: Mr. Attorney General, starting with the FISA Court:
well-respected, maintains secrecy, experienced in the field - and I
posed this question to you in my letter - why not take your entire
program to the FISA Court within the broad parameters of what is
reasonable and constitutional and ask the FISA Court to approve it or
disapprove it?
GONZALES: Senator, I totally agree with you that the FISA Court
should be commended for its great service ....
SPECTER: Well, speaking for myself, I would urge the President to
take this matter to the FISA Court. They're experts. They'll main-
tain the secrecy.21 8
If the judges on the FISC are indeed trustworthy, experienced, and com-
petent, then there should be no hesitation to vest them with the addi-
tional powers that this Note proposes. Either the FISC can be trusted
with these grave responsibilities or it cannot, but there should be no
going half way.
To be sure, the proposals in this Note impose new duties on the
FISC that will consume time and require increased effort. But rather
than refer to these obligations as burdens, they should be recognized and
216. The Nomination of John Roberts to be Chief Justice of the Supreme Court Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/09/13/AR2005091301469.html (testimony of Hon. John G. Roberts Jr.,
Nominee for Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court).
217. Id.
218. Wartime Executive Power and the NSA's Surveillance Authority Before the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, supra note 2, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2006/02/06/AR2006020600931 .html (statements of Sen. Arlen Specter, Chairman, Sen. Comm.
on the Judiciary, and Alberto Gonzales, Attorney General).
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appreciated for what they are: commitments to civil liberty. Regardless
of whether the reader agrees with this Note's specific proposals, two
things have become clear: first, helpless and oblivious Americans have
been subject to unlawful electronic surveillance under FISA; and sec-
ond, citizens can no longer rely solely on preventive measures if any-
thing is to be done about it. FISA represents a fragile balance between
national security interests and civil liberties.2" 9 As errors in the FISA
process continue to upset this delicate balance, and as the use of elec-
tronic surveillance intensifies with the War on Terror, it is time to finally
consider adopting affirmative measures that will provide relief for the
civil liberties that are sacrificed.
B. Informing the Broader Debate About Judicial Oversight
Examining the notice problem, unlawful electronic surveillance,
and civil liability under FISA should inform the broader debate and disa-
greement regarding the role of the judiciary in the foreign intelligence
surveillance process.
To reiterate this Note's introductory points, the errors documented
in Part III do not support the argument that the FISA process should be
eliminated. Rather, they illustrate that the imperfections in the process
can be more efficiently monitored, prevented, and documented by
strengthening judicial oversight. It has not been disputed that the substi-
tution of the NSA program's freedom to wiretap without judicial over-
sight for FISA's probable cause and certification requirements would
drastically exacerbate the number and severity of civil liberty viola-
tions. 2 ° This is simply a practical application of checks and balances.
Even if one disagrees with the proposals suggested in Parts IV and
V to reveal and remedy these errors, they still illustrate that the judiciary
may be employed in new ways to fulfill its historic role of safeguarding
individual liberties. Employing a return and notice procedure analogous
to the one in Title III could not be accomplished if the courts were
removed from the process. Nor could civil claims be brought before
219. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
220. To be sure, the errors identified in Part III would technically no longer occur if FISA
becomes optional or is eliminated; application process errors would not occur because there would
be no requirement that the government submit an application, and implementation errors would
not occur because there would be no requirement that the government implement a court order.
This illustrates the paradoxical conclusion that the existence of errors has some positive value
because they reflect the presence of a constraining authority. Preventing errors by eliminating the
statutory requirements does nothing to further civil liberty interests.
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courts that had no access to or familiarity with the process. The moment
that the judiciary is removed from the equation, not only will the number
and severity of civil liberty violations increase, but the options available
to remedy them will greatly diminish.
